A new paper is been getting some attention. It makes the case for biological computation. (This is a link to a summary, but there's a link to the actual paper at the bottom of that article.) Characterizing the debate between computational functionalism and biological naturalism as camps that are hopelessly dug in, the authors propose … Continue reading Biological computation and the nature of software
Category: Mind and AI
Maybe we’re already part of a hive mind
I recently discovered the new TV show Pluribus, about a scenario where the whole world gets turned into a hive mind, an annoyingly nice one, at least in the initial episodes, but where a few humans turn out to be immune to the virus that converts everyone else, including the cantankerous protagonist, Carol Sturka. The … Continue reading Maybe we’re already part of a hive mind
Why I still think Turing’s insight matters
Nature has an article noting that language models have killed "the Turing test" and asking if we even need a replacement. I think the article makes some good points. But a lot of the people quoted seem to take the opportunity to dismiss Turing's whole idea. I think this is a mistake. First, we need … Continue reading Why I still think Turing’s insight matters
What is it like to be you?
In 1974, in a landmark paper, Thomas Nagel asks what it's like to be a bat. He argues that we can never know. I've expressed my skepticism about the phrase "what it's like" or "something it is like" before, and that skepticism still stands. I think a lot of people nod at it, seeing it … Continue reading What is it like to be you?
What is a non-functional account of consciousness supposed to be?
I'm a functionalist. I think the mind and consciousness is about what the brain does, rather than its particular composition, or some other attribute. Which means that if another system did the same or similar things, it would make sense to say it was conscious. Consciousness is as consciousness does. Functionalism has some advantages over … Continue reading What is a non-functional account of consciousness supposed to be?
Mind uploading and continuity
As a computational functionalist, I think the mind is a system that exists in this universe and operates according to the laws of physics. Which means that, in principle, there shouldn't be any reason why the information and dispositions that make up a mind can't be recorded and copied into another substrate someday, such as … Continue reading Mind uploading and continuity
Manifest and fundamental consciousness
I think the problem of consciousness is primarily one of definition. The word "consciousness" can refer to a range of concepts. Some of the concepts are scientifically tractable, while others, once we clarify them, are metaphysical assumptions that we can either choose to hold or dismiss. This is one of the reasons I find exploring … Continue reading Manifest and fundamental consciousness
The edge of sentience in AI
This is the fourth in a series of posts on Jonathan Birch’s book, The Edge of Sentience. This one covers the section on artificial intelligence. Birch begins the section by acknowledging how counter intuitive the idea might be of sentience existing in systems we build, ones that aren't alive and have no body. But he urges us to … Continue reading The edge of sentience in AI
The edge of sentience in animals
This is the third in a series of posts on Jonathan Birch's book, The Edge of Sentience. This one covers the section on animal sentience. I think it's fair to say that this is the section Birch is most passionate about. It's definitely the one where I feel his activism most keenly. A concept he … Continue reading The edge of sentience in animals
The edge of sentience in humans
This is the second in a series of posts on Jonathan Birch's book, The Edge of Sentience. This one is on borderline cases of sentience in humans. Birch looks at cases involving humans with disorders of consciousness, such as those in vegetative or minimally conscious states, as well as fetuses, embryos, and neural organoids made … Continue reading The edge of sentience in humans









