I've written before about panpyschism, the outlook that everything is conscious and that consciousness permeates the universe. However, that previous post was within the context of replying to a TEDx talk, and I'm not entirely satisfied with the remarks I made back then, so this is a revisit of that topic. I've noted many times … Continue reading Panpsychism and layers of consciousness
Category: Mind and AI
The system components of pain
Peter Hankins at Conscious Entities has a post looking at the morality of consciousness, which is a commentary on piece at Nautilus by Jim Davies on the same topic. I recommend reading both posts in their entirety, but the overall gist is that which animals or systems are conscious has moral implications, since only conscious … Continue reading The system components of pain
Why embodiment does not make mind copying impossible
A while back, I highlighted a TEDX talk by Anil Seth where he discussed that cognition is largely a prediction machine. Apparently Seth more recently gave another talk at the full TED conference, which is receiving rave reviews. Unfortunately, that talk doesn't appear to be online yet. But one article reviewing the talk focuses on something … Continue reading Why embodiment does not make mind copying impossible
Is consciousness only in the back of the brain?
There's an interesting debate going on among some neuroscientists about which parts of the brain are involved in subjective experience. On the one side are Christof Koch, Giuilio Tononi, and colleagues who argue that consciousness exists wholly in the back of the brain, that the frontal structures are not involved. On the other side are neuroscientists … Continue reading Is consciousness only in the back of the brain?
What about subjective experience implies anything non-physical?
Mary's room is a classic philosophical thought experiment about consciousness. The Wikipedia article on what's called the knowledge argument quotes Frank Jackson, the originator of the argument, as follows: Mary is a brilliant scientist who is, for whatever reason, forced to investigate the world from a black and white room via a black and white … Continue reading What about subjective experience implies anything non-physical?
A possible answer to the hard problem of consciousness: subjective experience is communication
In 1995, David Chalmers coined the "hard problem of consciousness": It is undeniable that some organisms are subjects of experience. But the question of how it is that these systems are subjects of experience is perplexing. Why is it that when our cognitive systems engage in visual and auditory information-processing, we have visual or auditory … Continue reading A possible answer to the hard problem of consciousness: subjective experience is communication
The illusion of phenomenal consciousness?
Philosopher Peter Hankins at Conscious Entities has a write-up on the November 12 issue of the JCS (Journal of Consciousness Studies) in which philosophers, psychologists, and neuroscientists such as Keith Frankish, Daniel Dennett, Susan Blackmore, and Michael Graziano, debate whether it makes sense to refer to phenomenal consciousness as an illusion. Unfortunately the full text of the … Continue reading The illusion of phenomenal consciousness?
Is consciousness a simulation engine, a prediction machine?
Back in September (which now seems like a million years ago), I did a series of posts on consciousness inspired by Todd Feinberg and Jon Mallatt’s recent book, ‘The Ancient Origins of Consciousness: How the Brain Created Experience‘. In that series, I explored consciousness as a system modeling its environment and itself as a guide to … Continue reading Is consciousness a simulation engine, a prediction machine?
The problems with philosophical zombies
In any online conversation about consciousness, sooner or later someone is going to bring up philosophical zombies as an argument for consciousness being non-physical, or at least some portion of it. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy introduces the p-zombie concept as follows: Zombies in philosophy are imaginary creatures designed to illuminate problems about consciousness and its relation … Continue reading The problems with philosophical zombies
The range of conscious systems and the hard problem
This is the fifth and final post in a series inspired by Todd Feinberg and Jon Mallatt's new book, 'The Ancient Origins of Consciousness: How the Brain Created Experience'. The previous posts were: What counts as consciousness? Predators and the rise of sensory consciousness Types of sensory consciousness The neural mechanics of sensory consciousness In the … Continue reading The range of conscious systems and the hard problem
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