Peter Carruthers has been blogging this week on the thesis of his new book, Human and Animal Minds: The Consciousness Question Laid to Rest. I mentioned Carruthers' book in my post on global workspace theory (GWT), but didn't get into the details. While I had been considering taking a fresh look at GWT, his book … Continue reading For animal consciousness, is there a fact of the matter?
Category: Mind and AI
The issues with higher order theories of consciousness
After the global workspace theory (GWT) post, someone asked me if I'm now down on higher order theories (HOT). It's fair to say I'm less enthusiastic about them than I used to be. They still might describe important components of consciousness, but the stronger assertion that they provide the primary explanation now seems dubious. A … Continue reading The issues with higher order theories of consciousness
Global workspace theory: consciousness as brain wide information sharing
Lately I've been reading up on global workspace theory (GWT). In a survey published last year, among general consciousness enthusiasts, integrated information theory (IIT) was the most popular theory, followed closely by GWT. However, among active consciousness researchers, GWT was seen as the most promising by far (although no theory garnered a majority). Since seeing … Continue reading Global workspace theory: consciousness as brain wide information sharing
The magic step and the crucial fork
Those of you who've known me for a while may remember the long fascination I've had with Michael Graziano's attention schema theory of consciousness. I covered it early in this blog's history and have returned to it multiple times over the years. I still think the theory has a lot going for it, particularly as … Continue reading The magic step and the crucial fork
The layers of emotional feelings
One of the ongoing debates in neuroscience is on the nature of emotions, where they originate, where they are felt, and how innate versus learned they are. One view, championed by the late Jaak Panksepp and his followers, see emotions as innate, primal, and subcortical. They allow that the more complex social emotions, such as … Continue reading The layers of emotional feelings
The barrier of meaning
In the post on the Chinese room, while concluding that Searle's overall thesis isn't demonstrated, I noted that if he had restricted himself to a more limited assertion, he might have had a point, that the Turing test doesn't guarantee a system actually understands its subject matter. Although the probability of humans being fooled plummets … Continue reading The barrier of meaning
The problems with the Chinese room argument
In 1950, Alan Turing published a seminal paper on machine intelligence (which is available online). Turing ponders whether machines can think. However, he pretty much immediately abandons this initial question as hopelessly metaphysical and replaces it with another question that can be approached scientifically: can a machine ever convince us that it's thinking? Turing posits … Continue reading The problems with the Chinese room argument
Integrated information theory
I think most of you know I'm not a fan of integrated information theory (IIT). However, it is a theory proposed by scientists, and I've always had a mildly guilty conscience over not having read about it other than through articles and papers. Some years ago, I tried to read Giuilio Tononi's book, PHI: A Voyage … Continue reading Integrated information theory
A standard model of consciousness?
I've often noted that I find more consilience than disagreement between the empirically grounded theories of consciousness. They seem to be looking at the problem at differing levels of organization, and together they may present a growing scientific consensus about how the mind works. In particular, a few weeks ago, when discussing higher order theories, … Continue reading A standard model of consciousness?
A correction: LeDoux’s actual views on instrumental learning in vertebrates
I have to make a correction. In my post on LeDoux's views on consciousness and emotions, I made the following statement: Anyway, LeDoux states that there is “no convincing” evidence for instrumental behavior in pre-mammalian vertebrates, or in invertebrates. In his view, instrumental behavior only exists in mammals and birds. As it turns out, this … Continue reading A correction: LeDoux’s actual views on instrumental learning in vertebrates
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