The Everett theory of quantum mechanics is testable in ways most people don't realize. Before getting into how or why, I think it's important to deal with a long standing issue. Everettian theory is more commonly known as the "many worlds interpretation", a name I use myself all the time. But what's often lost in the discussion … Continue reading Testing Everettian quantum mechanics
Category: Philosophy
Those inconvenient quantum interference patterns
Are quantum states and the overall wave function real? Or merely a useful prediction tool? The mystery of quantum mechanics is that quantum objects, like electrons and photons, seem to move like waves, until they're measured, then appear as localized particles. This is known as the measurement problem. The wave function is a mathematical tool for modeling, … Continue reading Those inconvenient quantum interference patterns
Is it just the math?
Scientific breakthroughs often begin with someone saying, "Don't panic. This crazy sounding assumption is just to make the math work." Nicholaus Copernicus, when he developed his theory of heliocentrism (the earth orbits the sun), was operating from a scientific realist view. In other words, he thought his system reflected actual reality, or at least reflected it … Continue reading Is it just the math?
Using alternate terminology
I often use non-standard language to describe concepts, and I've had a couple of people over the last couple of years call me on it. There seemed to be a sentiment that I was confusing things, or being sneaky in some way, by not sticking to the standard nomenclature. A short post about why I … Continue reading Using alternate terminology
The debate between scientific realism and anti-realism seems like it’s about theory scope
I've been thinking again about the realism vs anti-realism debate, about what scientific theories actually tell us about the world. Historically in the philosophy of science, the debate is between realists, who see scientific theories being at least an approximate representation of reality, and instrumentalists or anti-realists, who see those theories as mere prediction frameworks … Continue reading The debate between scientific realism and anti-realism seems like it’s about theory scope
Philosophical semanticism
This week, while working through my podcast backlog, I came across an interview of Jacy Reese Anthis. We discussed Anthis' paper on consciousness semanticism a few months ago. Like me, Anthis sees the term "consciousness" as ambiguous, one that has had a variety of different meanings over the centuries, and continues to have a range … Continue reading Philosophical semanticism
Universal functionalism
In one of the final chapters of his book: Reality+: Virtual Worlds and the Problems of Philosophy, David Chalmers asks, have we fallen from the Garden of Eden? "Eden" in this case is a metaphor for living in a world where everything is as it seems, matching our pre-theoretical view of reality. In Eden, everything exists … Continue reading Universal functionalism
Information, computation, and reality
David Chalmers in his book: : Reality+: Virtual Worlds and the Problems of Philosophy, has a discussion on information and reality. He identifies different types of information: semantic, structural, and symbolic. Semantic information is what we colloquially think of as information, it's the patterns that tell someone or something about reality. A map of a city … Continue reading Information, computation, and reality
Criteria for being real
David Chalmers in his new book: : Reality+: Virtual Worlds and the Problems of Philosophy, takes the philosophical stance of virtual realism. As I understand it, virtual realism is the thesis that virtual reality is genuine reality, with emphasis especially on the view that virtual objects are real and not an illusion. In general, “realism” is … Continue reading Criteria for being real
Can we know if we’re in a simulation?
I'm currently making my way through David Chalmers' new book: Reality+: Virtual Worlds and the Problems of Philosophy. Chalmers explores the simulation hypothesis, using it as a portal into a wide ranging selection of philosophical issues, including discussions on God, information theory, structuralism, and a lot of other topics I haven't gotten to yet. His … Continue reading Can we know if we’re in a simulation?









