Seems like I’ve been writing a lot about quantum mechanics lately. Apparently so have a lot of other people. One thing that keeps coming up is the reality or non-reality of the quantum wave function. Raoni Arroyo and Jonas R. Becker Arenhart argue for non-reality: Quantum mechanics works, but it doesn’t describe reality: Predictive power is not a guide to reality. (Warning: likely paywall.)
Along similar lines, in an article about what he says are quantum myths, Ethan Siegel argues that superpositions are not fundamental to quantum physics:
Superpositions are incredibly useful as intermediate calculational steps to determine what your possible outcomes (and their probabilities) will be, but we can never measure them directly.
Arroyo and Arenhart take a similar line. They argue that it would be more intellectually honest for wave function realists to call their position wave function pragmatism. As they note in the title of their piece, they don’t see predictive success as a guide to reality.
The question I want to ask these people is, if predictive power, if usefulness, isn’t your guide to what is real, then what is?
It’s worth thinking about why we care whether something is real or not. Is the sound I’m hearing from outside rain? Is the rain real? To say it is is to say I need to take an umbrella with me when I go outside, or be prepared to get wet. To say it isn’t is to say I can walk outside without worry of getting wet. We get similar considerations when trying to decide if a stock rally is real or illusory, or, from an evolutionary perspective, whether the sound in the bushes is a real predator or just a figment of your imagination. Reality is that which makes a difference, something which there’s a possible cost to ignoring.
Admittedly, this is a strange point to make when talking about quantum states. It might seem like whether they’re real has little to no bearing in our daily lives. But they do seem to make a difference for experimenters and quantum computing engineers. They have to take the dynamics implied in these mathematical tools seriously. In the case of quantum computing, it’s the very dynamics that seem to enable what they’re trying to do. Failure to treat them as real has consequences.
Now, I’m a structural realist. I think what we can count on being real in successful scientific theories are the structures they describe, at least to some level of approximation. That doesn’t mean we can count on them being fundamental, or that we know what they may be structures of. This is particularly important to remember with quantum theory, where the structures are all we currently have.
Does that mean that, rather than being structures of objective reality prior to a measurement, they could actually be structures of subjective expectations as the QBists argue? Or of the way the experimental equipment has been set up, as other antirealists argue? I suppose so. But that seems to imply the possibilities are completely set by these expectations or preparations, that if scientists really wanted to, they could get any result they wanted.
In practice, something seems to constrain the possible results. Of course, if I put on the epistemic hat, I could argue that those constraints are the constraints on their thoughts (QBism) or practical equipment limitations (other epistemics), not anything in the quantum realm. But taking this literally, that seems to imply that quantum physics is a big illusion, a side effect of the way scientists think or construct experiments. If so, how could anyone be sure that any scientific measurements beyond human senses are to be trusted?
All of that is before remembering that if we think anything objective at all is happening in the physics prior to a measurement, that there are mathematical theorems which kick in and demonstrate that quantum states must describe something real. Epistemic interpretations of quantum mechanics, such as Copenhagen, QBism, and RQM avoid this be saying there is no such objective physics prior to measurement (or interaction). Which, to me, makes calling them “epistemic” misleading. Qbists in particular argue for a “participatory reality,” a notion they inherited from John Wheeler’s “it from bit” idea.
This selective application of antirealism has always felt like gerrymandering to me. Most of the proponents want to resist the idealism label, but they seem to want to take from metaphysical antirealism just what they need to avoid quantum state realism. It all feels forced.
Interestingly enough, that doesn’t appear to have been Niels Bohr’s take. Historians often argue that he was more of a neo-Kantian than either an instrumentalist or idealist. His take seemed to be that the quantum realm was real, but inaccessible, the noumena always beyond the phenomena. Of course, this predates the theorems I mentioned above, which is what forces stronger stances from contemporary epistemic proponents.
But my issue with the Kantian view is it pushes reality into something utterly and forever unknowable. Reportedly, Kant’s motivations for doing this were to preserve space for God, the soul, free will, and morality in response to the “Crisis of the Enlightenment,” which seemed to call all of those things into question. I suspect neo-Kantians are trying to preserve different things, but that kind of preservation likely remains part of their motivation.
But the cost of doing so is to remove the practical aspects I noted above when deciding what’s real or not. In my view, it removes any utility from the concept of reality, except for talking in terms of theology or overall metaphysics.
Which may be why Arroyo and Arenhart want to use the word “pragmatic” instead. I think a better strategy is to retain our grounded everyday meaning for “real,” but admit that we never know whether we’ve reached ultimate reality. But this is coming from someone who doesn’t share the Kantian or neo-Kantian concerns.
Overall, my theory of reality is pragmatic. But I continue to wonder, for the people arguing against that take, what standard are they using?
What do you think? Are there issues with a pragmatic take on reality I’m overlooking? If so, what would be a better standard?
SelfAwarePatterns 
My experience and education in QM is rooted in chemistry. One of the most common applications is for the energies of atomic electrons. In that procedure in order to get positional probabilities for atomic electrons we had to square the wave function. This means that the wave functions represent the square roots of positional probabilities. If those, then are real what do they describe.
Wave functions seem to be linked to predictions. Some predictions are inexact, such as the 50:50 prediction regarding sad death of Schrödinger’s cat. When the box is opened, the wave function is not a physical thing that collapses, what collapses is the prediction, which settles on a 100% dead or 100% alive and the 50:50 prediction no longer exists.
I am so old when I started studying QM we addressed Matrix Mechanics. Schrödinger’s Wave Mechanics had easier math, so MM died a quick death. And if wave functions represent some sort of reality (other than a route to a prediction) doe matrices also? What does a collapsing matrix look like?
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The thing to remember about matrix mechanics is that it was demonstrated early on that it’s mathematically identical to wave mechanics. Note that’s mathematically identical, not just empirically. They always provide the same answers.
On matrices and reality, my understanding is that matrix mechanics were formulated with an explicit decision not to attempt to describe reality, only relate observables. But that means it’s not really accounting for what happens in between those observables. Wave mechanics does make that attempt. As a result, it has something to say, at least in principle, for every step in the evolution of the system.
Wave mechanics also account for the interference effects, something I don’t see in the (admittedly basic) write ups on matrix mechanics on the web.
Interestingly, matrix mechanics were developed in early 1925 and wave mechanics later that year, published in 1926. So I don’t think your age was why someone taught you matrices. And my understanding is that they can be a easier path to quantum field theory, so your instructor(s) may have had that in mind? Or maybe they just preferred matrices.
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Re “On matrices and reality, my understanding is that matrix mechanics were formulated with an explicit decision not to attempt to describe reality, only relate observables. But that means it’s not really accounting for what happens in between those observables. Wave mechanics does make that attempt.“
Schrodinger pulled wave functions out of a hat, that is by intuition. Any subsequent “relation to observables” came from attempts to do what Schrodinger did not. He just wanted mathematical simplicity and functionality. At least that is what I have read/viewed.
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Schrodinger seemed a bit cagey about how he figured out his equation, citing intuition. Which reportedly annoyed Heisenberg, who had meticulously ground out his matrices solutions.
But we know Schrodinger was trying to find the mathematics for Louis de Broglie’s matter wave hypothesis, an intuitive leap of de Broglie’s based on Einstein demonstrating the wave/particle duality of light. And it seems likely Schrodinger was influenced by the Hamilton–Jacobi equation.
However he did it, aside from needing to be generalized for relativistic scales, it’s stood for a century now with no one able to falsify or incontrovertibly extend it.
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I’m a little confused. It sounds like you, like me, are neo-Kantian, but you don’t want to be called that because you, like me, don’t share Kant’s motivations. Is that right?
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Uh, no. I’m not a Kantian, neo or otherwise. Not sure what I might have said to imply I was. I don’t think reality is unknowable. Maybe not all of reality is knowable, but reality in general is, at least as far as I can see.
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Heh. You’re playing around with two definitions of reality:
Ok, I’m labeling you as crypto-Kantian.
🙂
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[unless you’re saying #1 is the “real” reality]
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Reality is vast, and some aspects are more accessible than others. But in general I think it’s knowable. It certainly seems that if any portion of it can be known, it’s the ones who think it can be who are much more likely to acquire that knowledge.
If me being open to the mere possibility that some aspects may never be known makes you want to see me as a secret Kantian, well, if it makes you feel better. But based on what I’ve read, “Kantian” implies a stronger stance.
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Ah, ok. The Kantian stance is there will always be some reality that can never be known. We can usually go down a level, but it always takes more energy, and at some point you reach the level where there is not enough energy in the universe to go further.
Would you say “reality” is everything above that bottom energetic level, even if there are still levels we haven’t reached?
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When I think of Kantianism, I think of the distinction between “appearances” (which seem to encompass more than just sensory perceptions) and “things in themselves.” It’s the distinction between structure and relations, which are knowable, and non-relational intrinsic properties, which supposedly are not. I’ve never understood what the “things in themselves” concept was supposed to be. Given that all the structure and relations is in the first concept, I suspect the second is redundant.
Brian Cox, when talking with Neil deGrasse Tyson recently, noted that probing below the Planck scale requires so much energy that a black hole gets created. So if there’s meaningful reality below that scale, then, at least right now, it seems unknowable. Although who knows what future experimentalists could come up with. (See John Bell as an example of someone figuring out a way to learn something previously seen as unknowable.)
In any case, I see it all as reality, but none of it as “things in themselves.”
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“…that seems to imply that quantum physics is a big illusion, a side effect of the way scientists think or construct experiments.”
Exactly; this is not an either or statement, it’s both. First, it is a side effect of the way human beings think and second, it is also the way scientists construct experiments. The double-slit is the quintessential example of both the rationale used to interpret the findings as well as the engineering controls used to construct the test apparatus. Both are fundamentally flawed.
“If so, how could anyone be sure that any scientific measurements beyond human senses are to be trusted?”
It’s all about utility, that’s the answer to your question, right? Is a given tool useful for what we are trying to accomplish? If it is, then we’ve accomplished what we set out to achieve because we have empirical evidence of its effectiveness as a tool.
The flint Clovis Tip is the quintessential example. It is a useful tool for killing large mammals, but other than that, what does it tell us about the true nature of reality? The same assessment applies to the Schrodinger equation as well. It’s great tool for making predictions, but like the Clovis tip, that tool tells us nothing about the true nature of reality.
Uncertainty is the psychological hurdle that we have to overcome, not trying to pigeon hole the majesty of reality itself into a mechanistic framework because it makes us feel better.
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Right, but if we can’t use predictive accuracy to assess what we know about reality, then what standard should we use?
Is actual reality something so far beyond our reach that even talking about it is pointless? If not, what enables us to have those discussions?
And what label should be use for these concepts that provide high utility? Aside from the data showing it, at what point would we say it stops working, and why?
Feel free to answer or ignore any of these you’d like. I’m just putting down the questions that occur to me as I consider your points.
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Talking about actual reality is not pointless however, what enables us to have those discussions is recognizing that the models of reality we have inherited, namely idealism and the antithesis of materialism are historical artifacts.
If we cannot or will not set those artifacts aside and move on, then the discussion ends. Every time I bring up this conundrum, all I get is an incredulous stare. And I know why I get that stare, it’s because individuals are emotionally and psychologically invested in either materialism or idealism to the point, that they can’t even imagine that there is another way.
“And what label should be use for these concepts that provide high utility?”
We should call them what they are, they are tools, magnificent tools. Anthropology 101: Homo Sapiens are tool makers. All of our scientific knowledge without exception is derived from inventing, using and making tools. In all seriousness, does it make sense to you that inventing, using and making tools should be the standard by which we assess what we know about reality?
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Looks like part of your reply might have been cut off Lee.
“If we cannot or will not set those artifacts aside and move on, then the discussion ends.”
I think for people to set aside things like that, they need an alternative. If we rule out materialism and idealism, and I think you ruled out neutral monism the other day, what are we talking about? Some other variant of panpsychism? I know you used to talk about pansentientism.
“Tools” might work for some things. But if I’m just wondering whether the rain is real, or a storm that might be heading for me, are those tools? We definitely can use tools to learn about them, but they themselves seem like something else.
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You either missed my point or deliberately trying to deflect. I never implied that the reality we find ourselves in is a tool.
“I think for people to set aside things like that, they need an alternative.”
That is the natural response of course, but I think the initial first step requires the ability to recognize that both of these historical artifacts are not tenable. And until one reaches that consensus first, no other alternate explanation will be given serious consideration because of the investment made in one of the two alternatives.
How about you Mike, have you given up on materialism as it is currently framed by the scientific community?
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My view remains roughly physicalist Lee, in the sense that I expect things to work by principles we can eventually discover. I’m interested in understanding proposed alternatives, but right now there’s nothing making that urgent.
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I’m a physicalist as well Mike with one important distinction. I have not been radicalized by scientific extremism into believing that reality is mechanical, deterministic and causally closed.
“I expect things to work by principles we can eventually discover.”
Freedom is a principle right? Is freedom something that we can eventually discover? What if the universe was not governed by entailing laws of any kind, and as result if was free to express itself. It that were the case, then we’d have to entertain the idea that the universe is the very definition of life itself.
It should not be dismissed that self organization, a phenomenon responsible for complexity and diversity operates within a larger context of emergence that cannot be fully predicted or explained by the mechanisms of physics. It therefore becomes self-evident that the universe itself possesses life-like properties which make the notion of “life” a more realistic and inclusive rendition of nature in contrast to a mechanistic, determinate and causally closed universe.
Complexity theories increasingly utilize endosymbiosis as a foundational model to argue that life and consciousness are products of cooperative merging rather than just competitive survival. This perspective reframes evolution as a series of “major transitions” driven by symbiotic partnerships. This too is a radical break from the naive idea of a mechanical universe and opens the door to freedom of expression.
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Thanks for the description Lee! As you know, my view is mechanical and deterministic. But I also realized this morning how much our metaphysical priors can limit what we’re willing to consider. So this universal life, a sort of panbios(?), doesn’t really grab me, but maybe I’m wrong. If it’s a view that works for you, you should push it as far as you can.
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Re:
> Along similar lines, in an article about what he says are quantum myths, Ethan Siegel argues that superpositions are not fundamental to quantum physics
I think this take is confused. While I think it is correct, the argument that is given just does not concern itself with superpositions at all because it seems to talk about a statistical mixture of states. Maybe the language is just chosen poorly/wrong but correcting for that (in the sense that the author meant a superposition of states instead of a statistical mixture) still does not make the point imo.
Here is how I see this: Superposition is not a physical property of some state. It depends on the basis one chooses to describe the problem. As such it can never have an observable consequence.
Tbh, I am unsure what exactly 'fundamental' means here in this context. In layman's terms, I would say that superposition is a fundamental concept in the usual formalism of quantum physics. But it is not a physical property of a state (because it depends on my choice of basis) and as such the question whether it can be measured is ill-posed imo.
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Sounds like you agree with Siegel that superpositions aren't physical but have issues with his language.
My question would be, if they're not physical, where do the interference effects come from?
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I’m not sure structural realism and pragmatism are compatible. For a structural realist, structures are absolutely real, as opposed to objects, which are less real. For a pragmatist, structures are real when you need them to be, and physical objects are just real when you need them to be (that is to say, when useful).
It’s the same with colour. There are those who would argue that colours are not real. But if they’re useful, say for recognizing food or danger, is that enough to make them real in some sense, for some purpose?
On the Kantian thing-in-itself, it was Kant’s position that space, time, and causality are ways that the human mind makes sense of reality, and what lies behind them is unknowable. To the extent that quantum physics presents us with riddles about space, time, and causality, this could still be said to apply. To the extent that our mathematics helps us get around these limitations, it could be said that what seemed unknowable may yet be knowable. But by “knowable” here we mean “knowable through the math,” which still leaves room for “incomprehensible to human intuition.” To that extent, the ting-in-itself would remain opaque or mysterious to us.
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I view structural realism as a pragmatic form of scientific realism. And a structural realist, like any realist, sees structures as approximations of reality, hopefully to ever increasing precisions. To that extent, objects are real, since they’re structures. They’re only not real if by “real” we mean objects in some primitivist sense that overlooks what science knows about molecules, atoms, and the various forces.
I think the right way to see color realism is to understand the scope of that realism. Color exists as a relationship between aspects of the environment and an organism’s evolutionary affordances. It’s our nervous system’s way of enhancing discriminations and deciding which are more important. This is easier to understand if we think about sensations like sweetness, bitterness, hot, cold, etc.
On Kantian thought, right. That’s basically the historical rational for the epistemic interpretations. Although as I noted, the various theorems have constrained that. So now these interpretations deny any reality prior to the measurement (or interaction). (To be fair, that’s long been the stance of many Copenhagenists.) It evades the theorems, but at the cost of mixing in metaphysical antirealism, or “participatory realism” in the words of Chris Fuchs, or “flash ontology” in Carols Rovelli’s language.
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I’m as comfortable as anyone with talking about the “scope” of a realism. But this means I can be comfortable thinking about a participatory realism or a flash ontology when it seems useful, and just as comfortable talking about a wave function when it seems useful. I don’t see alternatives to wave function realism as having a cost, but as presenting an advantage, depending on the uses to be served..
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Advantages and costs seem like two sides of the same coin. If a view has advantages, and I forgo it, then I give up those advantages, in other words, incur costs.
What would you see as the advantages of participatory realism, or of a flash ontology? Are we talking in terms of enhanced predictive power?
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Advantages and costs may be two sides of the same coin, but with pragmatism that’s how it is. what you take as “real” concerns how you weigh the advantages. The only measure of reality is whatever works best for whatever you’re trying to do.
If the wave function provides a good calculation tool, that’s an advantage, but if it fails to address how anything actually happens, perhaps some other approach is more useful for that purpose. Participatory realism offers a way forward for thinking about events as they transition from possibility to actuality; the wave function has nothing at all to say about that. Flash ontology, if this is how Rovelli’s views are being styled at the moment, seems to speak to the quantum foam that some say underlies our ongoing reality; again, the wave function is silent about it.
Pragmatism is entirely agnostic about what’s ultimately real; every nominal realism has its proper scope of application. Even religious talk refers to something real, if it has its uses (as it assuredly does). Talk of colours and smells refers to the real,. Of course we always have in mind the scope of the realism in question, its proper domain of application.
So the fact that the wave function is useful suggests that it’s about something real, but if the argument is purely pragmatic then the sense of “real” is seriously watered down. Other ideas of the real are not automatically displaced or usurped. If you’re hoping by this argument to secure the wave function as the best description of reality for all purposes, across all scopes, for all uses, I don’t think it’s going to work.
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It seems like you’re making a lot of statements about pragmatic positions. It’s worth noting that pragmatism is a family of views. If you’re going off of William James’ version, that’s not one I personally hold to. For me, the entity has to be useful for prediction, or something related, to be taken as real. I know James took psychological wellbeing as one of his uses, but many pragmatists distanced themselves from his version.
I’m not hoping to secure the wave function as the best description of reality for all purposes. It doesn’t seem like anything could fulfill that role. But it is the best description for many purposes, where the alternatives require an enormous amount of work to use. And the structure only needs to match reality at some level of description, not be anything fundamental. I’m agnostic on what it may be a structure of. It’s the idea that it’s a mathematical contrivance with no relation to reality that I think is unsustainable.
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I’ve never made a study of pragmatism. My understanding of it comes partly from reading James, but more from Rorty, and also from the implications of Wittgenstein’s later views. This evening’s ferry ride across Halifax Harbour wasn’t long enough for me to read the entire Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy article on the subject, but I did pick up that there are flavours of pragmatism—in fact, a bewildering variety. The article begins:
“Pragmatism is a philosophical tradition that – very broadly – understands knowing the world as inseparable from agency within it. [Make of that what you will! – JO] This general idea has attracted a remarkably rich and at times contrary range of interpretations, including: that all philosophical concepts should be tested via scientific experimentation, that a claim is true if and only if it is useful (relatedly: if a philosophical theory does not contribute directly to social progress then it is not worth much), that experience consists in transacting with rather than representing nature, that articulate language rests on a deep bed of shared human practices that can never be fully ‘made explicit’.”
Perhaps among these alternatives we can find your view that “Overall, my theory of reality is pragmatic.” Under the circumstances, what you mean seems to need elaborating. This is especially true if you want to know “for the people arguing against that take, what standard are they using?” For me, the first question has to be, “What take are you using?”
So if I’ve misunderstood you, I apologize, but with reservations. As far as I’m concerned, the central tenet of pragmatism is that the sole criterion of truth is usefulness, and I took this to be your position—especially since you seem to be defending the claim of the wave function to be a description of the truth solely on the grounds that it is useful (unless I misunderstand again).
I realize that this pragmatic notion of truth has consequences which some may find uncomfortable or concerning (I know I do), but I didn’t realize the extent to which they would attempt to salvage the name “pragmatism” for some modified position that protects the notion of “usefulness” from applications they find disagreeable. According to the SEP, Pierce had the grace under pressure to give his variation a new name, “pragmaticism.” But the SEP also refers to “self-described pragmatists” who have “objected to certain tenets of neopragmatism, particularly Rorty’s blithe dismissal of truth as a topic better left undiscussed (Rorty 1982), and have sought to rehabilitate classical pragmatist ideals of objectivity. (Examples include Susan Haack, Christopher Hookway and Cheryl Misak.) These philosophers are now sometimes referred to as New Pragmatists.” Perhaps this new philosophical position more accurately identifies your views?
The idea that the wave function is “a mathematical contrivance with no relation to reality” seems like a straw man (or I guess a straw person). I don’t think anyone would take the position that it has no relation to reality. What’s in dispute is whether it’s a complete description of reality. I thought this was your position (assuming the many-worlds interpretation as a direct implication), but perhaps you’ve come to reconsider. It does surprise me to hear you say that this structure only needs to match reality at some level of description, and that you’re agnostic on what it may be a structure of, because to me this sounds closer to Epistemic Structural Realism than Ontic Structural Realism. Indeed, it hints at a thing-as-such, a reality about which we can only be agnostic.
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I feel like focusing on the intricacies of which pragmatic theory my view might fall under is a distraction. I gave a more precise statement in the post by pointing out my structural realism. As I noted above, I take that to be a fairly pragmatic take on scientific realism. Strong scientific realism has historically not been seen as particularly pragmatic due to the pessimistic meta-induction, but the main benefit of structural realism is it’s far less vulnerable to that issue.
On the wave function, here I’m going to quote M. S. Leifer, who has a long paper exploring this topic in detail, including the mathematical theorems which constrain which notions are viable. https://arxiv.org/abs/1409.1570
He notes that there are two versions of epistemic interpretations. The first he calls “neo-Copenhagen” (applying to contemporary Copenhagen, Qbism, RQM, etc). From the paper (page 6):
That’s what I meant by “no relation to reality.” I suppose one could argue that “the outcomes of future measurements” count as reality. Ok, but that supposed knowledge seems to exist in isolation, with no lineage of how it’s supposed to have been acquired.
The other version of epistemic, which seems like a natural one to take and is similar to what you postulated, a view I actually once held, he calls “Realist psi-epistemic.” (also page 6):
The problem is that this type of epistemic is the kind ruled out by the mathematical theorems I mentioned in the post, at least without rejecting the theorems’ assumptions, like preparation independence. Leifer’s paper goes into agonizing detail on these issues.
Ontic structural realism is not the proposition that scientific structures can’t have hidden, not yet known, structures underneath them. I don’t think anyone serious would argue for that. It’s only the proposition that whatever might be underlying those structures will be more structure and relations. (The word “fundamental” does often get thrown around in discussions, but it’s usually meant as fundamental within the context of a particular theory, not a claim to the absolute bedrock of reality.)
Epistemic structural realism argues that there are non-structural intrinsic properties underlying those structures that we can never know. It’s that neo-Kantian-like take I noted in the post. But if we can never know about them or say anything about them, we can’t even know if they exist. It strikes me as an empty unproductive concept. Which is why I land on ontic structural realism these days. At least until someone points out something I’ve missed.
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Far be it from me to introduce a distraction! At the end of your post you asked, “What do you think? Are there issues with a pragmatic take on reality I’m overlooking?” In good faith I tried to answer, but it seems I failed to guess what you meant by “pragmatic.” From the title I thought it simply indicated “usefulness,” in the time-honoured way, and from the text, more specifically, “predictive power,” which is a kind of usefulness. (Vegetables are useful, but not necessarily for their predictive power.) As you put it, “The question I want to ask these people is, if predictive power, if usefulness, isn’t your guide to what is real, then what is?”
That’s the question, but there is a separate question lurking here, and it concerns the reality of the wavefunction, also known as the quantum state. One may say either that it denotes something real, or that it is merely a calculational convenience—that is, merely useful. Clearly when you put it this way, usefulness is no guarantee of reality.
On this point, Leifer’s paper doesn’t serve you well. On page 72 he says, “Modern neo-Copenhagen views include the Quantum Bayesianism of Caves, Fuchs and Schack [16–18], the views of of Bub and Pitowsky [19], the quantum pragmatism of Healey [21], the relational quantum mechanics of Rovelli [22], the empiricist interpretation of W. M. de Muynck [23], as well as the views of David Mermin [24], Asher Peres [25], and Brukner and Zeilinger [26]” (emphasis added). Now, Healey’s quantum pragmatism may not be the kind of pragmatism you have in mind—at this point we can only guess—but the fact that Leifer calls it “neo-Copenhagen” might give you pause, even if my argument does not.
At least we’re all asking the same question. In Leifer’s words, “What is at stake then is the following question: When a quantum state |ψi is assigned to a physical system, does this mean that there is some independently existing property of the individual system that is in one-to-one correspondence with |ψi (up to a global phase), or is |ψi simply a mathematical tool for determining probabilities, existing only in the minds and calculations of quantum theorists? This is perhaps the most hotly debated issue in all of quantum foundations. I refer to it as the ψ-ontic/epistemic distinction and use the terms ψ-ontic/ψ-epistemic to describe interpretations that adopt an ontic/epistemic view of the quantum state.”
The ontic/epistemic distinction Leifer mentions here is the same one concerning Epistemic Structural realism and Ontic Structural Realism, except that in this case we are talking about the wavefunction rather than a more general “structure.” It boils down to this: ontic structuralists hold that the structure they describe is ontic, that is, “real,” while epistemic structuralists hold that the structure they describe is epistemic, that is, a construct of our understanding or learning which merely represents to us something that is not entirely captured by the representation. Leifer simply maps this distinction to the wavefunction: does it correspond to something ontic, or is it just an epistemic tool? It doesn’t have to be more complicated than that, although of course professional philosophers can and do complicate it endlessly.
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I don’t think finding one mention of someone calling their view pragmatic does anything against my case. Healey has a SEP article on his views, which is focused on QBism and its relation to pragmatic views.
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/quantum-bayesian/
But in general I find its focus on usefulness too narrow. For instance, there’s no mention of structural realism or quantum computing, a technology which makes aggressive use of the predictive power of the wave function.
I think my post, taken in total, makes clear the usefulness I’m talking about is predictive power, not good nutrition or psychological wellbeing. It’s in response to that IAI piece which indicated predictive power has no bearing on reality. And my question remains, if usefulness for predictive success isn’t the standard we use to judge what is real, then what is?
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Leifer’s paper provides a link to Healey’s paper (Quantum Theory: A Pragmatist Approach). Good to know there’s also an SEP article for reference.
Maybe the first thing anyone should have asked is how you feel about complex numbers. They’re useful for predictive success. Does that make them real?
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Similar to negative numbers, I think complex numbers can represent real relations. Just as I can’t have -8 widgets, I can’t have 8i widgets. But there can be relations between how many widgets you have and how many I have, like maybe how many widgets one of us owes the other, where those types of numbers become useful. Mix in geometry or trigonometry about our widget piles and their relation, and complex numbers may crop up.
But complex numbers were useful before quantum mechanics. The question you should be asking me is how I feel about 3N dimensions (where N is the number of particles). If there’s anything that makes me nervous about full wave realism, it’s that. (Many realists curtail the degree of realism to the 3 space dimensions, even though it results in inseparability for entangled particles.)
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I’m not convinced that complex numbers are in the same class as negative numbers. The latter can be expressed relationally in ordinary math, but the square root of a negative number is inexpressible in any terms we can understand. When it starts showing up in our algebra, all we can do is assign a letter and ask no further questions. It’s useful, but points to nothing real, and that’s my point. It means that the useful is not necessarily a guide to the real, and if you want to defend the reality of the quantum state, I wouldn’t rely on that argument to do so.
I might have asked about 3N dimensions if I knew anything about them, (Hanging around your blog is always a learning experience.) I did consider bringing up the renormalization of infinities and asking whether that particular calculational convenience represents something real, or is on the contrary in defiance of a reality we don’t know how else to work with. But complex numbers made the point nicely (I thought), and I saw no need to suggest further examples.
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Math isn’t my thing, so take with a grain of salt. But the use of negative numbers seem to make complex numbers hard to avoid. They’re heavily used in several science and engineering disciplines. Occasionally someone tries to remove them, but the results always sound like they’re a lot more difficult to work with.
I’ve heard that QFT involves a lot of ugly math, like renormalization of infinities. Not familiar enough with that one to have an opinion. I’m happy that it’s not my job to do the calculations!
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You probably know more about the math than I do, but somewhere in my recent reading I acquired the impression that some formulas in physics use squared values to avoid problems with negative numbers.
Even so, complex numbers sometimes show up. I understand they’re used in the Dirac equation, and of course the Schrodinger equation.
Reportedly, Dirac was deeply offended by the math needed to remove infinities.
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Complex numbers are used in a lot of classical physics as well. If you have to use geometry or trigonometry, they’re probably going to show up.
There’s a long history of people being offended by things like irrational numbers, complex ones, infinities and other strange concepts, wishing they’d just go away. From what I’ve read, it was scientists and engineers who often forced the matter, because they just turned out to be too damn useful to ignore.
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“ if usefulness for predictive success isn’t the standard we use to judge what is real, then what is?”
Here is AI’s response:
If usefulness for prediction isn’t the sole standard for reality, other criteria for judging “what’s real” include coherence (internal consistency), explanatory power, empirical evidence (beyond just prediction, like observation), correspondence to experience, simplicity, and even pragmatic acceptance.
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Coherence might be a prerequisite for us deciding that something is real, but I don’t think by itself it’s enough. Incoherence, on the other hand, can be a useful standard for ruling a proposition out.
Explanatory power, empirical evidence, correspondence to that evidence, are really just other ways of talking about predictive power, at least to me. Even pragmatic acceptance, we tend to do because there’s a cost to ignoring that reality, that is, our expectations (predictions) aren’t met unless we make that acceptance.
Unless, that is, I’m overlooking something.
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Within a mechanistic framework you would see it that way. Are you sure you’re not a “bot”? 😲
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Ha! I am a meat bot. 🙂
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“…how you feel about complex numbers. They’re useful for predictive success. Does that make them real?”
What makes debates like this so difficult is that everyone forgets that “real-ness” is context dependent. Everything is real within its own context including complex numbers. The context of realness for numbers is that they exist in our minds.
Another important question; are complex numbers physical, and if so, where do we find them. Again, we find them in our cranium, ie., our minds; and because they are in our minds, that means they are physical as well.
It’s all so confusing, but with the right metaphysics, namely reality/appearance metaphysics, issues like this are easily resolved.
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Please don’t include me among those who forget that realness is context-dependent. That’s basically my contribution to the discussion.
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Ultimately we can’t ever grasp fully any reality external to our minds. We can only understand it through the interfaces we have with it. If we grasp a rock in our hand, we are not perceiving the rock (thing-in-itself) directly. We are perceiving the reactions of our sensory neurons in our hand as it makes contact with the rock. That our brains and minds are constructed from the same “stuff” as the external reality allows us through evolved, innate capabilities perfected by learning and experience to create a decent enough simulation of the rock that we feel we are touching the thing itself.
Science can extend the interfaces and formalize them; hence, its pragmatic value for understanding reality and its ability to provide an illusion of objective reality. With most things, this works well because we can match what science tells us with our experiential interfaces, even if science sometimes upsets our preconceived notions. QM presents a conundrum because the reality its science reveals seems to defy our experience rather than augmenting it.
Doesn’t your pragmatic take put you in the “shut up and calculate” camp?
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Consider, what about the rock can we never know, even after extensive scientific investigation? If you say the rock in itself, what does that mean? Most often people mean hidden structure, but hidden structure is knowable, at least in principle. Kantians mean something non-relational and intrinsic, whatever that means. I strongly suspect things in themselves, in the Kantian sense, is an empty concept. But maybe I’m wrong, which is why I keep asking people what they think it means.
Shut up and calculate can have its uses. But it’s a hard stance to maintain. My experience is that most of the people who try inevitably end up talking in terms of the ontology of some interpretation (typically Copenhagen). And if our goal is to actually understand what’s happening in the measurement process, or more broadly how quantum mechanics fits in cosmology, it actively avoids exactly what must be explored. And again, I’ll point out that the theory of quantum computing was developed by quantum state realists. You might be able to use QC while being in the shut-up-and-calculate camp, but before it existed, that camp didn’t have the tools to conceptualize it.
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“what about the rock can we never know?”
Well, we wouldn’t know that, would we?
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If it’s forever unknowable, how do we even know this thing-in-itself aspect is even there? That’s why it seems like an empty concept to me.
But maybe I’m overlooking something?
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You appear to me to be vastly over-thinking this.
Look at this another way.
When you feel the rock in your hand, what is happening?
Are you actually “feeling” the rock or is your brain interpreting the reactions of the sensory neurons in hands?
The first would be equivalent to naive realism. The second would be the view from neuroscience. This may seem to be an unexceptional point in our contemporary world, but for most of human intellectual history, the first view predominated if the matter was even thought about at all.
Qualia and our knowledge of the world external to our brain originate in interpretation of our senses by the brain. That’s in part what makes it difficult to see how something non-biological and without sensory neurons could be conscious.
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Maybe I am overthinking it. But maybe it needs considerable thought?
On the rock, there’s a causal chain between the rock, my hand, my peripheral nervous system, my CNS, brain, etc. And certainly, in that instance, what I’m aware of about the rock is coming through that causal chain, which will inevitably have noise, and so the state of my modeling of the rock will be far from isomorphic. At best it will be an approximation in terms of evolutionary affordances.
But both us and Kant live in the age of science. There are many other causal chains we can construct and use to learn more about the rock. It’s why we can now say so many things about it that wouldn’t be evident to me while I’m holding it. For Kant’s distinction to hold, he can’t just mean the manifest image vs scientific image of the rock. That would have been evident even in his time (although not to the same extent). Remember, his goal was to leave space for God, the soul, free will, morality, etc, which it was felt were being encroached on by science and reason.
So the reality he’s talking about is beyond science and reason. In the case of the rock, science can tell us everything about what the rock does. But, according to this argument, it can’t tell us about what it is. If you buy that there’s an aspect of the rock beyond what it does, beyond it’s structural relations at all levels, then that’s the “rock-in-itself.” That’s the reality we can never know anything about.
It’s supposedly something intrinsic, non-relational. I’ll be honest. I don’t even know what that’s supposed to mean. It’s not clear to me it’s coherent, although I’m open to the possibility that’s just my lack of understanding. But by Kant’s own standards, it’s utterly unknowable, at least by any path we accept today as a valid way to learn about it, outside of things like religious traditions.
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“there’s a causal chain between the rock, my hand, my peripheral nervous system”
Right, and the chain goes through the sensory neurons and that is what allows the brain to construct the rock. The brain doesn’t feel the rock directly. In fact, any causal chain would in some way need to pass through sensory neurons even if the chain involves reading a mass spectrometer. It could be argued that nothing reaches a state of knowledge until it does reach the brain.
“If you buy that there’s an aspect of the rock beyond what it does”
You really are overthinking this. I’m not making an argument for any of Kant’s motivations or goals. Our knowledge “about what the rock does” comes from extensions to the same causal chains that allow us to feel the rock in our hand. It doesn’t pop into our brains completely bypassing any experience. What is reaching the brain is the reaction of the neurons most directly and only indirectly the properties – relational, structural, or whatever- of the rock itself.
The reason I am harping on neurons is that there is a substantial disconnect break in the type of interactions in the causal chain from rock to neuron. The neuron is inside the organism, the rock is outside. Sensory neurons (at least for the outward facing) exist at the boundaries of the organism as interfaces with the external world. Employment of the sensory neurons almost always requires active interaction by the organism. We need to run fingers over the rock in hand to learn much about it. Finally and most importantly, the class of physical material and information contained in the nervous systems is vastly different from the original source of the information. Touch neurons are mechanoreceptors. Eyes pick up electromagnetic radiation. Whatever triggered the neuron is converted into biological information.
If a rock hits another rock, simple physics can describe what happens. When a rock hits your head, simply physics might account for a little bit of the result, but your actions in ducking, moving to cover, and later nursing your aching head need a little bit more explaining.
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I’d say there’s nothing special about the causality inside the organism. I’ve mentioned before my dental pain issues over the last few years, which complicated localizing the pain to the right location, among other issues. Even inside the brain, the connections between different regions are subject to the same limitations, which is why I often point out there’s no reason to see introspection as any more reliable than any other type of perception. Still, a large part of science is compensating for these limitations.
Definitely once agents are involved, a physical explanation ceases to be the easiest one to model what happens. We then switch to what Daniel Dennett called the intentional stance, a stance that often works even for simple organisms. And technological systems. When diagnosing complex systems where I work, it’s not that unusual for us to implicitly switch to the intentional stance, and ask when a system “knows” about a certain business event.
But if we’re not talking about Kant’s concept, then it doesn’t seem like we’re talking about anything unknowable in principle. Unless I’m still missing something.
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What you’re missing is that knowledge and reality resides in the brain and mind along whatever your judgment is about its usefulness. Reality has no meaning if it is disconnected from mentality. A rock doesn’t know what is real and what isn’t.
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I’m not so much missing it, as I just disagree. The universe existed before anything perceived it, and there are all kinds of things happening in our environment right now that we don’t perceive, at least without special equipment.
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“The universe existed before anything perceived it”
But reality doesn’t exist until there is something that can perceive. There was nothing before minds to distinguish the real from the unreal or even realize there was a problem. In fact, the entire problem about how to determine what is real makes no sense in a world outside of mind.
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Assuming you’re not coming at this from an idealist type perspective, we might mean different things here by “real.” Maybe a difference between existence tout court and appreciation of that existence? Hopefully we agree that models of a universe that existed before life evolved most closely fit the current data (under conventional definitions).
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What do you mean by “real?”
For me, “real” requires that the opposite “unreal” has a meaning. “Reality” implies a perceived alignment between mental models and the external world.
“Existence tout court” is as vague and ill-defined as Kant’s “thing in itself.” In fact, it may close to same thing. That may be the crux of your problem with the wave function. In what way, do you think the wave function is real? Because certainly the wave function is “real” in the sense that it exists in some form, even if it is simply a mathematical convenience. Do you really mean “physical,” rather than “real?”
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Asking if it’s physical threatens to go down a similar definitional rabbit hole. Is it only physical if we can see or touch it? If so, then electrons and gravitational waves aren’t physical. Is it physical if it produces objectively observable and predictable effects? Then yes, quantum states are physical.
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Quantum states could physical but that might not mean the wave function is physical. As far as I know, we can’t detect the wave function directly itself. We can only detect that certain outcomes conform to what it describes. Wouldn’t it need to tag along with every particle/wave, but then how would you separate it from the particles/waves themselves?
Unless it is detectable itself, it wouldn’t be physical in my view. So, if it isn’t physical, where or how does it exist in “reality?”
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Quantum states are what the wave functions describe, and that’s what people mean when they talk about whether it’s real, physical, etc.
Is gravity physical? We never directly detect it, only infer it from the movement of things affected by it. What about x-rays, quarks, or neutrinos? Or nuclear fusion? All of these are inferred from other phenomena.
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That’s what I said when I wrote “We can only detect that certain outcomes conform to what it describes.”
The wave function describes a range of possibilities. When we describe gravity, we use a formula that generates a definite value, not a range of values.
But aren’t arguing that the wave function is a real physical wave, not simply a mathematical function?
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The wave function’s evolution is deterministic. Its predictions for a population of outcomes probabilistically asymptote toward deterministic. And quantum computing circuits depend on its predictions for their operations, including manipulating interference to promote the correct answer throughout its states so that it’s present on output. If the wave function isn’t describing something real, then what is happening in those circuits?
But, in the end, there’s no way to convince a determined skeptic that something is real rather than merely very useful for predictions, particularly if you’re good with the associated metaphysical antirealism.
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“Real” is in the mind of beholder, not out there somewhere in the universe.
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According to Kant’s standard, the only way to learn or acquire knowledge of any kind is through direct experience, and that “experience” is an intellectual exercise that takes place in our heads.
For example: One can never have any knowledge of mathematics unless or until one works the process internally within our mind. It is only through the direct experience of actually doing mathematics intellectually that mathematical knowledge is acquired.
Addressing the reality we can never know anything about: “It’s supposedly something intrinsic…”
It is something intrinsic. And to be succinct, it’s actually the “only” thing each one of us knows with absolute certainty. It is something we’ve always known, even as a newborn infant.
But here’s the sticking point: I can articulate using symbolic representations what the “thing-in-itself” actually is, but like mathematics, if one does not engage, nor participate in the actual intellectual exercise, no knowledge of what it is will be acquired. And to be clear, it has nothing to do with religious traditions.
Cute little riddle, eh?
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Right. Maybe there’s something there that I’m either deficient in seeing, or just too much in denial about to see. Of course, all observation is theory laden. So maybe I’m just seeing it through a different theoretical filter. But if it can’t be described so we cam compare notes, not sure how it can be resolved.
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Your theoretic filter is mechanistic, so there’s that; and a mechanistic world view is a huge obstacle which will prevents us from having a productive exchange of ideas. In contrast, a living universe that is free and unbound; well, that opens the door to unlimited possibilities, even productive conversations.
Eric would be quick to recite that the only thing he knows with any certainty is the he exists; and I suppose most would feel that way. But long before an infant knew it existed, it intrinsically knew something fundamental, something that was absolutely essential for its intellectual development.
Just like you and I, a newborn infant knows value. It intrinsically knows the difference between a high value experience and a low value experience. But just like the thermos that keeps hot things hot and cold thing cold, how do the infant know? Sentience, that’s how; sentience is the universal language of meaning for all forms of life, be it inorganic, biological or quantum.
Is it possible that “value” is Kant’s thing-in-itself? I don’t know, but value is one of those words that we just cannot seem to contain, no matter how hard we try. Push it, indeed I have. My poor wife of 51 years calls me the “pusher man”; after the song “The Pusher” by Steppenwolf. Goddam the pusher man….
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Eric also has a high regard for the role of value. I do too, to some extent. If you remember my hierarchy of consciousness, value laden reactions typically sit at the foundational layer.
But as usual, my view is mechanistic. To me, value, at least innate value, is programmed goals. Evolved programming in the case of organisms, designed programming for technology. And I agree, a baby does know certain types of value. It knows that hunger, pain, and loneliness are bad, among many other things.
The pusher man. Interesting nickname. Just listened to the song, I thought for the first time, but see it was used in Easy Rider, which I did see some years ago. But I’m generation X, so late the party.
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“….a baby does know certain types of value. It knows that hunger, pain, and loneliness are bad, among many other things.”
You’re missing the point; and the point is that the infant doesn’t know that it’s hunger, pain, loneliness etc. All it knows is that something needs attention “I know not what”. Until it possesses the ability to discriminate and make a correlation, the only thing it knows with absolute certainty is its intrinsic, intimate relationship with value; and that relationship is active participation with the “thing-in-itself”. The value dynamic comes first in hierarchy.
Regarding Eric’s rendition: Eric sees the value dynamic as a derivative of consciousness, whereas I see the value dynamic as the fundamental substrate of evolution that is ultimately responsible for consciousness. He has the tail wagging the dog…….
I have to chuckle a bit because your response reminds me of a line in the movie “Sicario” where the Mexican dude told the naive female federal agent: “Nothing that you are about to hear today will make sense to your American ears.”
“Nothing that I write today or tomorrow Mike will make sense to your mechanistic ears……..”😎
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I agree with you that biological value predates consciousness, going back very early in the evolutionary line. In my view, it arises shortly after organisms begin responding to their environment, with more adaptive responses being naturally selected.
“Nothing that I write today or tomorrow Mike will make sense to your mechanistic ears……”
Probably so. 🙂
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Cognitive psychology and neuroscience tell us that everything we perceive is perceived because it provides a good explanation, with high explanatory power, of our interaction with the world. If explanatory power is not good evidence of reality, then we’re just up **** creek without a paddle.
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Exactly! The thing to realize is we know our way to our fridge by the same principles. If we couldn’t predict the actions that would take us there, or anywhere else, we’d be in serious trouble.
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“Reality is that which makes a difference, something which there’s a possible cost to ignoring.”
Wouldn’t that require subjects to perceive the difference? What could be said about the nature of reality before life evolved?
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Just to be clear, this is about how we know what is real. I’m not an idealist or participatory realist, or anything else along those lines. Reality itself is always there, both before and after there’s anything to perceive it.
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I’ll first say that Mike and I have been discussing this stuff in my new Substack post, which has the broad theme that science could be improved by means of explicit, professionally accepted rules of metaphysics, epistemology, and axiology. https://eborg760.substack.com/p/post5-founding-science My next three posts will provide my own three suggestions, beginning with metaphysics. Mike has come down against my suggestion that explicit magic be banned from science (or the topic of my coming metaphysics post).
Yes Mike, usefulness of explanation is generally an effective guide for what’s real. The issue is the other side. If the useful thing that one is proposing happens to involve magic, then this effectively “breaks science”. This is because the function of science inherently depends upon systemic causality regarding what exists (or reality itself). So without that chain, science goes obsolete to the degree of the failure.
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I share the same bias, that explanations should be causal or structural. But I’m also aware that sometimes the only working explanation will have gaps. And anytime that happens, there will be people arguing that the gaps aren’t gaps, but just something fundamental. I don’t think we should throw out a theory that works when it’s the philosophy accompanying it that may be at fault.
I think science only becomes obsolete when it stops focusing on what works, even when the solution doesn’t match up to our metaphysical expectations. When ideological purity becomes more important than what works, then science is broken. We should be open to those expectations, which themselves are theories or meta-theories, changing, just like any other theory. Otherwise we run the risk of doing something like Lysenkoism.
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The problem with a metaphysical presumption of “whatever works”, is that “working” is the end goal. Yes we want whatever works, but what specifically is that? Conversely I’m saying that science itself goes obsolete to the degree that systemic causal fails, or a more specific claim that doesn’t simply state the end goal.
Let’s say there’s a 50 kilo steel ball in some laboratory with as many instruments observing it as we like. Then it disappears without apparent reason. Might it have “quantum tunneled” somewhere else? AI says there would be an astronomical number of zeros after the decimal point for a probability of such an event in a given year. And even if that were indeed the reason, there would still be plenty this explanation wouldn’t tell us since the causality associated with QM is highly disputed to say the least. But let’s even grant that QM is not responsible for this disappearance.
Only two possibilities would seem to then exist. Either we’d simply be unaware of the causal dynamics behind the disappearance, or it would be a magical event and so reside beyond worldly causal dynamics anyway. If causality does apply then we’d simply be ignorant of that causality, though this would still remain for science to potentially discover. If the disappearance were magical however then there wouldn’t be worldly causal dynamics to even potentially grasp. Thus this would display an obsolescence to science, and specifically to the extent that systemic causality does indeed fail. Furthermore in that case it should be a waste of time in general for standard scientists to consider theories which directly posit magic, and because these theories preclude the causality itself that science seeks. That’s why I think explicitly segregating causal science from causal plus science, should be productive.
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I’m not arguing for anything metaphysical, just a practical view about how we should assess scientific theories. But at this point we’re just repeating our arguments.
I think it’s fair to say you think scientific theories should be subject to your metaphysical standards regardless of whether they fit the data. While I share many of those metaphysical positions (although we disagree on applying them), I’m not so confident in my biases that I’d be onboard with rejecting or suppressing every theory that doesn’t fit them. We’ve had this disagreement for a while, so we won’t resolve it today. 🙂
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Yes I would restrict science in one way even if the data holds for a given proposal. But you’re not mentioning my pragmatic reason to do so. The reason is because magic inherently renders science obsolete (as displayed by my steel ball disappearing example). So this leaves you in opposition to claim that magical proposals should be considered in science even if magic renders science obsolete. Furthermore I’m saying that my position is more pragmatic than yours given that science should function better in general if magic were formally ejected. Less time should thus be wasted going down a road that invalidates the road itself.
You’re countering that this position leaves me vulnerable if magic actually does exist. But I don’t think I am vulnerable there since I also propose a “causal plus” form of science which is specifically dedicated to magical theory. And indeed, if I had sufficient evidence, I could believe in magic. I don’t have anything close, but if I did I wouldn’t call this a standard scientific proposal. Technically this would be “causal plus” science. The great William of Occam noted the failures that I speak of back in the 14th century, and even considered it blasphemous to mix godliness with worldliness.
I guess the only way to convince you that it would be productive to formally ban magic from standard science, would be to provide examples in my coming post which display that far too much time is being spent in science today on magical theories. And that could be a problem since my two favorites, computational functionalism and “ontic many worlds”, are proposals that you don’t consider magical. Hopefully I can dig up something more, but we’ll see.
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One thing you might think about. Who decides whether any particular theory has magic in it? For the examples you cite, the relevant experts don’t see any magic, even the ones who criticize them. Or there’s the recent spat about IIT, for which there is intense debate whether it’s pseudoscience. It’s not like there’s any one central authority to rule on these things. They get hashed out in the relevant fields over years and decades.
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That’s a great question Mike! It shows you thinking about the possibility that I might be right about this. So perhaps science would work better if it had certain explicit rules of metaphysics, epistemology, and axiology. And who would decide these rules? Theoretically “metascientists” would, or a new breed of philosopher charged exclusively with doing so. And how would this get decided? First there’d be various groups politically arguing for their positions. Once the most popular principles are out on the table however, that should tell us some things. Perhaps there would be a clear preference among relevant specialists? Regardless this would have to get worked out. I’m proposing a system where respected professionals vote on a given topic (metaphysics, epistemology, and axiology) and if there are competing principles to pick from then those rules and their vote totals could get fed to AI to find a weighted answer from the results. I’ll try this among ourselves in my next three posts. Just as we we could come up with founding rules of science, experts could as well.
Your question addresses a next step however. Let’s say that years from now there is a respected group of metascientists who provide explicit principles of metaphysics, epistemology, and axiology. And let’s also say that regarding metaphysics they end up agreeing with me that systemic causality should be the parameter that differentiates between regular and causal plus science. Your question is, how would it be decided which models violate this condition? Actually the authors of a given model should tell us this. If they believe that their model doesn’t violate causality then it would be up to them to demonstrate this against any criticism that it does. So it’s like you said, things would get hashed out. But now explicit magic would demote a given model to “causal plus” form of science.
On the magic I see in computational functionalism, that was addressed in my post #3. https://eborg760.substack.com/p/post-3-the-magic-of-computational But actually it applies to consciousness theories in general. Because naturalism mandates that information can only exist as such by informing something causally appropriate, there must be something causally appropriate that processed brain information informs to reside as what sees and thinks and such. Thus all substrate-less consciousness proposals, including IIT, are either incomplete for leaving this question open, or directly magical for claiming that consciousness exists anyway. Unfortunately experts aren’t yet aware of my argument.
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“It shows you thinking about the possibility that I might be right about this.”
Sorry, no, for all the reasons I’ve already covered. Just calling your attention to another difficulty.
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Well then thanks for the engagement Mike! It all helps.
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“But my issue with the Kantian view is it pushes reality into something utterly and forever unknowable.”
The Kantian view evokes strong emotional and psychological responses for the very reasons you listed. That’s also the reason why Reality/Appearance Metaphysics has been continually rejected throughout history beginning with Parmenides.
But a metaphysical framework should not be adjudicated based on how we might feel about it. The fact is, we don’t have to like it. The final arbiter should be logical consistency. And that logic is this: “one cannot get some thing from no thing.”
Ontic Realism recognizes and acknowledges that there is an ultimate reality of some kind responsible for our conventional world even if we do not have a clear understanding of what that might entail.
Albeit, this intellectual exercise requires a certain level of psychological maturity as well as a higher than normal tolerance for uncertainty in order to avoid psychotic reactions.
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I don’t really feel any strong emotion about the Kantian view. It just doesn’t strike me as particularly useful. If there are aspects we can never know anything about, not even in principle, then how can we even be sure they exist? How can we be sure that anything we way about it isn’t hopelessly wide of the mark?
I totally agree that a metaphysical framework doesn’t have to be liked. It just has to be logical. Unfortunately, there appear to be multiple frameworks compatible with observations. It’s why Kantians tend to be attracted to one type of QM interpretation, and determinists a different type. Interpretations under a different framework than one’s own will always seem utterly wrong headed, because they don’t have those shared assumptions about reality.
Accepting that we can’t convince people across those frameworks, or that doing so is very hard, may be the maturity we need to cultivate.
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That there are multiple frameworks compatible with observations applies also to politics. It’s difficult to convince people across these frameworks. Yet in the case of politics, at least, it seems like something we should be trying to do. Lately, with my musings on “ways of seeing,” I’ve been thinking about the problem. And I wonder if “convince” is the right word.
Perhaps the goal is not to change people’s minds, so that they drop one framework in favour of another. Perhaps we need to open people’s minds to the validity or interest of another framework. They don’t have to be convinced, but they need to see that there’s another way of looking at things, and to let this other way affect how they think about their own viewpoint.
The incommensurability of viewpoints need not be an issue if we can give a little on the need for rigorous consistency, to allow or entertain paradox, or more simply to acknowledge the puzzle that in any consistent system, there is something that cannot be said.
I happen to be reading a book by Lyotard that touches on the similar idea of “paralogy” as a solution to the postmodern failure of grand narratives (The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge). For me, it’s plainly a “Doctrine of the Two Eyes” thing, and it could be the subject of a new post, if I ever shake off my current posting doldrums. Maybe maturity, or wisdom, is found in the ability to transcend a particular framework in order to appreciate multiple frameworks.
How the heck does this apply to quantum theory? I have this crazy idea that the wavefunction is at the boundary between possibility and actuality. The many worlds it supposedly contains are not actual, but possible futures. The quantum psyche, if we may posit one, amounts to an ability to read or scan these possible futures and choose among them. The “collapse” is the choice.
Just throwing that out there!
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I do think there’s a lot to be said for trying to understand where people are coming from with views we disagree with. Where is the difference in worldview that leads to that difference in the question at hand? And if we try on that broader view, can we see where they’re coming from?
This is one reason why, when laying out my own view, I often say something like, “This is me speaking as an X,” where X is something like structuralist, functionalist, etc. I know my argument won’t land with a panpsychist or idealist (as examples), and I’m trying to make clear I don’t expect it to. And I’ll sometimes try to acknowledge that I can see the other person’s point as a Y, where Y is whatever metaphysical position they hold that I don’t. Although I probably don’t it often enough.
Your QM view sounds similar to the idea of consciousness causing the collapse. Although if I’m understanding you, you’re saying we choose the outcome. Some questions I have, only to be answered if you feel like it. As a panpsychist, do you see every particle, in some sense, making a choice? Or are we only talking about macroscopic consciousnesses? And how do we square it with each individual outcome being random, but a population of them following predictable patterns?
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My own approach is to avoid statements like “I am an X,” where that might be panpsychist, perspectivist, idealist, and so on. For me it feels like defending a hill, and that’s not my intention. Instead, when faced with an apparently hardened position, my instinct is to question it, while not actually proposing some pet theory I think should be adopted instead. I do have leanings, but by this process they tend to be contrarian.
Thanks for indulging my idle speculations. They’re really more like science fiction than theories. But yes, if we take a many-worlds perspective, we can think of each world as a block universe, outside time and complete in itself. But because it’s outside time, it doesn’t exist in the sense usual to us; there are not an infinite number of worlds existing in time. There is only one actual world, and it exists at the rolling point of intersection of multiple block universes.
The occurrences at these points of intersection (Whitehead would call them “occasions”) are capable, in an amazing quantum-calculation way, of assessing the fate of various block universes present at the point of intersection, and it is in their nature (and interest, I suppose) to choose among them. One could think of this as a perpetual course-correction in the unfolding of the actual world; and of course with course-correction this mostly consists of staying the current course, which explains why we find a certain statistical predictability.
It also helps reconcile the idea that we are in our own block universe with the so-called arrow of time, without committing us to an entropic heat death by default. The apparent blockishness of our universe is the path woven by the occasions through every possible block universe, but at the point of their intervention there remains a degree of freedom. How they actually make choices remains a puzzle; but if we think of the occasions as analogous to the neurons in our own brains, then some kind of vast calculation going on in the wave function does not sound completely implausible. (Just wild-eyed, and perhaps alarmingly theological.)
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I can understand the desire to avoid ism labels. Adopting one can cause people to make too many assumptions about our views. But they’re also very useful for conveying a lot of information very quickly. If I say I’m a physicalist or moral antirealist, it does quickly convey my attitude toward a lot of things, even though there are always caveats. My approach is often to accept the label but wear it lightly, and not be afraid to just say I don’t support a particular proposition just because others in that ism do. Although for me it really depends on the specific label.
Thanks for elaborating! The block universe is an interesting metaphysical possibility. Special and general relativity seem to make it inevitable, but I’ve personally never seen it as anything that would impinge on me. The perspective of the block would be from outside of time and space, which we can never take.
And of course, the question has always been what quantum mechanics means for it. For me, in the many-worlds scenario, it wouldn’t be each individual world that was a block, but all of them together. For any individual world, quantum randomness would be irreducible. So no one individual agent’s history would ever be in a block, only all of them together.
Of course, if one of the hidden variable theories are true, then we’re back to the classic block universe. Although even there, the determinism is not something we’d ever be able to “cash out.” The fact that the deterministic variables are hidden would prevent us, even in principle, from being able to predict it all. We’d still be beings that had to anticipate possible and probable consequences and make the best decisions we can with that.
I do wonder at times how the theological accounts would adjust if any one of these interpretations were ever conclusively demonstrated. If it was many-worlds, would we see narratives of God making sure a version of each soul was good, even if it also ensured one would be evil? It seems like a non-theist could just put the worlds out of mind, but I imagine a theist would be compelled to find some account.
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Labels can convey a lot of information very quickly, but there’s a risk that they convey both too much information, and not enough. If I say I’m a panpsychist or a perspectivist, the next part of the conversation involves dispelling various misconceptions and misunderstandings; I’m sure you find the same with physicalism or illusionism. Behind each simple marker is a host of variations, and it gets to the point where a label like “panpsychism” or “physicalism” is little more than a vague gesture toward a cloud of related ideas. The labels offer a false clarity, sending discussions off into unproductive digressions and rehearsals of standard arguments. My interest is more in the unlabelled, unspoken, often unrealized assumptions that draw the ideas into clouds.
For me, the block universe refers to the time-reversible description of the physical universe offered by our fundamental equations. In it there is no past or future, and not really a “now” either. If there are many worlds, then either there are many corresponding block universes, or the many worlds comprise a single block universe. But if the latter, then each individual world is not in itself a block universe — and then how do we describe these individual worlds? My guess is that physics would call the known one that is this world a block universe, and describe the many-worlds theory as a theory that there are many worlds like this one, i.e. many block universes.
If that makes sense, then our particular block universe is like a thread through the wave function. The course of the thread is influenced by its history, but not completely determined by it; at any point, it can head off in different directions. The possible directions are constrained by their nearness to the current thread, but not completely determined by it; there is a probabilistic element to the way the thread will go.
In the sense that every such thread constitutes a block universe, I suggest that its course is theoretically predictable, and I suggest further that this theoretical predictability is within the grasp of agencies that can read the possible futures and select among them.
That’s the wild-eyed theory I’m trying to convey. I’m not sure how your remarks on determinism or compatibilism are meant to inform it, unless it’s to persuade me of your alternative account.
I mention theology because the idea of an agency that can scan all possible block universes and determine a course through them suggests thoughts of God. But I wouldn’t assume that theists feel compelled to account for God in terms that respect the current scientific theory. Unlike much of philosophy these days, theology does not lend itself to science envy.
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On many-worlds and the block universe, part of the problem is that the word “world” conveys some misleading connotations if you don’t understand the physics. I guess it’s vulnerable to the issues you discuss with labels. A “world” in the Everett interpretation is a term of art, a way to quickly convey the idea of the portions of the universal wave function perceivable by an individual agent. This isn’t the same kind of multiverse as the ones discussed in cosmology.
There’s a similar interpretation out there called consistent histories which, although having an anti-real stance toward the wave function, still sees all the outcomes as continuing to exist, each in their own separate “history.” Everettians themselves often talk in terms of “branches.” These terms don’t invoke the idea of a separate world or universe, and all it implies, like each having their own deterministic time reversible dynamics. In Everett, you have to look at the full wave function to get that. Or you can think of it more as a block multiverse where each individual universe has randomness in it.
I wasn’t really trying to persuade you to any alternative. Just noting that Everett many-worlds may not be the foundation for your idea. It sounds to me like you’re talking more in terms of a type of collapse interpretation, but with a lot more collapsing than what is normally understood. All the histories exist in potentiality, but then collapse into the actual history based on decisions made.
On theists, definitely not all of them would worry about it. I was thinking what my impulse would be if I were one, but maybe that’s why I’m not. 🙂
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No doubt the Everettian multiverse is not the same as the cosmological multiverse. But by most accounts it’s also not about the portion of the wave function accessible to an individual agent. It’s more about the multiplication of the agent, as you suggested with your musings about a person being good in one world and evil in another. The Everettians do talk in terms of branches, but as this Scientific American article explains, “the branches become independent and each turn out looking like the classical reality we are accustomed to”. I think it’s safe to say that the classical reality we are accustomed to is sometimes described as a “block universe,” at least by those who are not Everettians.
And this is where we seem to be getting off the track. As a committed Everettian, you seem to be explaining (a) why competing theories do not fit the Everettian framework — which goes without saying — and therefore (b) why they must be confused or incorrect — which does not.
My wild notion (one could scarcely call it an idea) is not exactly a collapse theory, because it leaves the wave standing at all times, at the junction between possibility and actuality. It does not propose a block multiverse, whether that might consist of multiple block universes, or multiple things that are not exactly block universes but instead each have randomness in them. (I might infer from your statements that you think randomness is compatible with the universe we actually know, and that therefore this universe is not a block universe, but this seems an unlikely position for you to take, so maybe I’m missing something.) Instead my notion involves a single universe, apparent to us as “the block universe,” which threads its way as actuality through the multiple possibilities of the wave function. I suppose to the extent that possibility turns into actuality, an idea of collapse is involved, but the wave function never collapses; it exists continuously in all its wonderful fullness at the junction of threads, as the very medium of possibility. Still, your summary that “All the histories exist in potentiality, but then collapse into the actual history based on decisions made” is as good an approximation as any for my notion.
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“you seem to be explaining (a) why competing theories do not fit the Everettian framework — which goes without saying — and therefore (b) why they must be confused or incorrect — which does not.”
I haven’t criticized any interpretations in my last few replies, just laid out the properties of some of them. I get the feeling you’re hearing a criticism in my words that I don’t intend. (I am of course fully capable of criticizing various views, and do so often. But I haven’t been doing it in these recent remarks.)
“(I might infer from your statements that you think randomness is compatible with the universe we actually know, and that therefore this universe is not a block universe, but this seems an unlikely position for you to take, so maybe I’m missing something.)”
What you see as unlikely is the position I take. 🙂
The wave-only view (Everett) preserves an overall deterministic reality, which I’ll admit does meet one of my metaphysical biases. But it’s not a determinism we as individual observers can access. For us, individual quantum outcomes and any effects they produce, are unavoidably random, even in principle. There’s no way for us to know ahead of time where we are relative to a particular wave function. So to whatever extent quantum outcomes bleed into macroscopic scales, I think it prevents our knowable world from being a block one. It may be part of an overall block reality, but we can’t access it at that level.
As I noted above, the closest things in quantum mechanics interpretations that I know do provide the classic one block universe ontology are hidden variable theories (like pilot-wave) and superdeterminism. Only superdeterminism provides a determinism we could ever hope to cash out. But as you noted, those aren’t my views.
Ok, I think I get what you’re saying. All the possibilities exist, but only one is the real one. Maybe a better word than “collapse” would be “selection.”
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You surprise me! But how does this randomness play out? Does it really bleed from the quantum to the macroscopic scale? I thought you were a skeptic about that. Or are there other ways randomness comes into play, for example in the kind of processes Prigogine talks about?
Yes, “selection” is probably a better word than “collapse,” especially if it captures some agency that can assess the expected course of things. I think that aspect is the difficult sell metaphysically. On the other hand I don’t see any other way to introduce the idea of selection in stochastic processes, especially if a Solms-style consciousness of possibilities is eventually to be invoked.
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It’s true that I’m skeptical of most invocations of QM to explain natural macroscopic phenomena. In that space, assumptions are rampant but evidence, or logically complete hypotheses, seem scarce.
But we know how to amplify isolated quantum effects into the environment; aka do a measurement. It seems prudent to assume what can happen in a lab can happen in nature. I tend to think the macroscopic world is mostly deterministic, but “mostly” doesn’t seem like it’s enough for a block world.
Solms as in Mark Solms, with the affect centered view of consciousness? How would that tie in?
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Yes, that Solms. I reviewed his The Hidden Spring back in 2022. As I pointed out, there are at least two weird things about it: his explicit claim that feeling is always conscious, and his idea that consciousness resides at the physical centre of a Markov blanket (in the brainstem). Despite these concerns, I think he and fellow traveller Antonio R. Damasio are right to consider the role of affect in the development of organisms, and how it might relate to ideas from Prigogine and Spengler, via Gibbs I guess, about the evolution of dissipative structures. (Although Damasio’s Looking for Spinoza made a complete hash of Spinoza, as I pointed out in a 2023 review.)
Because of your functionalism, with its framing that an experience like red might signal something good or bad for an organism, I assumed you might be sympathetic to affect as a functional explanation, if nothing else. But perhaps again I am assuming too much.
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I did my own review of Solms’ book when it came out. I do think he makes a good case that consciousness theories often overlook the role of affects, and that Chalmers overlooks them in his famous description of both the hard and easy problems.
But a lot depends on how we define “affect.” Damasio, in one of his books, points out that there’s the automatic reaction, which he uses the word “emotion” for, and the perception of that reaction, which he uses the word “feeling” for. (It’s a mark of the definitional confusion in the field that his friend, Joseph LeDoux, uses the word “emotion” for the feeling, and “survival circuit” for the automatic reaction.)
There seems little doubt that the most basal automatic reactions start in the upper brainstem region, but the perception of that reaction is another matter. Most neuroscientists see it happening higher up, usually in the prefrontal cortex. But it’s pretty common for animal researchers to conflate the two and then consider evidence of the reaction as evidence for the feeling.
But from what I’ve read on pain research, it’s possible, at least in humans, to tease apart the automatic reaction, the perception of that reaction, and being conscious of that perception (or at least able to self report on it). It’s always more complicated than we’d like.
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I just replied to this, but in the wrong place. That still happens sometimes.
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Well, the usefulness of the wave function for experimental applications does not mean that it represents the ‘actual stuff’ described by quantum mechanics. In principle, the calculations can also be performed without explicitly assuming the existence of the wave function; this is what Heisenberg’s matrix mechanics does. However, disputing the reality of the wave function does not mean that there is no underlying reality at all.
The ‘mathematical theorems’ you mention (like PBR) typically kick in only if you assume that physical properties must be well-defined at every moment of continuous time . RQM avoids this not by being purely ‘pragmatic,’ but by proposing a sparse ontology: reality is not a persistent wave-stuff, but a discrete swarming of quantum events that occur whenever systems interact.
As Rovelli writes, “RQM is a theory of a set of quantum events related to one another in lawlike ways: it then turns out that the lawlike relations work in such a way that it is possible to define ‘systems’ such that that every event can be regarded as an interaction between two systems, so the notion of a system is not necessarily fundamental, but rather is used as an interpretative tool to help us make sense of the set of quantum events.”
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The thing about Heisenberg matrices is they make no effort to account for what happens between observations. That isn’t an accident. It was a decision that Heisenberg made, encouraged by Bohr. In many ways, by itself, it’s the behaviorism of quantum physics. But like behaviorism, it gives up explaining the actual reality.
Right, RQM evades the PBR theorem. No argument there. But it does so by saying there’s no reality before the interaction. (And the standard epistemic claim that quantum states represent experimental preparation, although I’ve never seen a detailed mapping for this.) Essentially it’s Heisenberg’s strategy (which Rovelli cites in his book). But what for Heisenberg could have just been epistemic, must become ontological for contemporary epistemic interpretations due to PBR and related theorems. Which in my mind now makes the label “epistemic” misleading; “anti-real” strikes me as more accurate
But overall my real issue with epistemic approaches is they just give up on the part I think needs explaining. I’m not satisfied with a lab recipe for scientists. I want to understand reality. I could accept a theory with this kind of gap as a placeholder, if we didn’t already have a couple of alternatives that fill it in, alternatives (wave function, path integrals) which converge on the same answers.
That said, I’m coming at this from a structuralist and reductionist perspective. A non-reductionist might be more able to accept that values set at interaction are a “fact of the world,” to quote Rovelli.
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(values set at interaction are a “fact of the world…”)
What is implicit in that statement is that value is an intrinsic, objective state of the world, something that we discover and therefore, something we relate to directly and intimately. And since it is the very ground of our own experience, value becomes the reference point from which we as agents are able to assign extrinsic value to the things of our experience.
Here is an assessment from a blogger I once engaged with: “What you describe as “value” here, I have often thought about as the “essence” of all that is. In other words the ‘value’ is the essential ‘meaning’ of reality itself. It would then be at the center of everything in manifestation, like the “substance” that everything in existence is made up of.”
Only a mechanistic reductionist would find this assessment troubling…
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Just to be sure we’re on the same wavelength here, when Rovelli uses the word “value” in that quote (from his SEP article), he’s referring to the quantitative value quantum variables have, such as spin, momentum, position, etc. And I have no issue with the value in an of itself. My issue is he’s saying we shouldn’t look for any reasons why the value is what it is, how it came to be, that there is in fact no reason, no causal or structural history behind it, that it just is.
As I noted in the reductionism post, historically a lot of progress happened from people who weren’t satisfied by those kinds of answers. If there is in fact a deeper meaning, it seems far more likely to be found by someone who keeps digging.
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“…there is in fact no reason, no causal or structural history behind it, that it just is.”
Correct; but this approach is not a deal breaker for a framework that is rooted in radical emergence. Even a good friend of mine who is a die-hard idealist conceded that emergence makes more sense than idealism.
Granted, some thing about nature are hard to accept but that’s all a part of the psychological maturity process. But accepting our limitations does not imply that we should not employ the reductionist techniques. We’ve got to be able to walk and chew gum at the same time because reductionism is not an either or proposition; although Reductio Ad Absurdum is the final arbiter of what real, not prediction.
Here’s a quote from a recent Scientific American article:
“Our ability to characterize nature relies on our capacity to question it, which depends in part on the technology available at any given period of time. It also relies on the human mind, which is “notoriously poor” at grasping holistic perspectives and better at dividing objects of inquiry into intellectually chewable bites. Too often, we overlook that our own limitations, not nature, generate isolating boxes, definitions and boundaries.
With time, the boxes become the entire landscape when they were simply meant to be pieces of a puzzle that connect with one another. These boxes shape and challenge our approach to scientific questioning, the development of intellectual frameworks, the boldness of our hypotheses, and our perspectives. They not only set artificial boundaries of where answers can be found, but also their nature and scope.”
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We had a good discussion about sDamasio’s approach at one of the posts in question (Intelligence and Affect: Looking Out for Spinoza. I doubt much has changed since then.
We never discussed Solms’ views on the hard problem, as far as I know. It’s been a long time since I read the book, and I no longer have it, but reviewing my own blog post (https://staggeringimplications.wordpress.com/2022/04/17/the-hidden-spring-part-iii-the-value-of-subjectivity/) and a separate review I volunteered for the public library database, I gather I wasn’t impressed.
In the blog post, I wrote that ‘Solms attempts to illuminate the hard problem by calling attention to the difference, which he feels Chalmers has missed, between our private experience in observing others’ brain functions, and our experience of the observed brain functions themselves as something outside consciousness. In his view, Chalmers has focussed only on the latter in distinguishing internal from external aspects of reality. For Solms, resolving the hard problem is simply a matter of invoking the subjective, private quality of our own experience as a factor in the scientific account of the brain.’ I went on to explain why I found this move less than satisfactory..
In the other review, as preserved on my computer, I wrote:
‘The final chapters turn to the well-known “hard problem” of consciousness. There are teasers throughout to the effect that Solms has solved it, but only in the penultimate chapter does he develop the argument. He does a good job of explaining Chalmer’s position, and suggests on page 272 that his own is a nuanced version. Rejecting Chalmer’s suggestion of pan-psychism as a “wild speculation” (p. 262), he psychologizes this proposal as an attempt to avoid an existential fear of death, and for good measure he adds on p. 263 that “it sounds unhelpfully like the idea of God.” But Chalmers allowed for the possibility of “a further constraint” that might limit phenomenal experience to certain cases only, and Solms positions his own theory as a promising candidate.
‘Instead of solving the hard problem, however, Solms seems to drift between the claim that his model explains how consciousness originates (Chapter 9, for example, being named “How and Why Consciousness Arises”), and the idea that it is one half of Chalmers’ dual-aspect monism. On p. 254 he remarks that to explain the hard problem, “you just need to come up with a mechanistic theory that explains both sets of phenomena [psychological and physiological laws, or experiential data and explanatory mechanisms].” On page 210 he even asks readers to “cross the Rubicon” and “consider the mechanistic dynamics I have described from the viewpoint of the system. . . the subjective perspective of the self-evidencing system itself. I am asking you to adopt the system’s point of view, to empathize with it.” Empathy is indeed a potent key to the problem of other minds, but it requires us to assume that they exist. Using this strategy to help explain how they come into existence seems like a dubious logical move.’
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Sounds like both of us had issues with Solms’ ideas, although probably from different directions. I’d forgotten about his remarks on the motivations (God, death, etc). I think I noted in my review that I doubted anyone troubled by the hard problem would find his argument persuasive. Pretty sure I got confirmation from commenters at the time, and your remarks here reinforce it.
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