Back in March, I did a post on a proposed Templeton Foundation project to test major scientific theories of consciousness. The idea was to start with a head to head competition between the integration information theory (IIT) and global workspace theory (GWT). Apparently that project got funded and, according to a Science Magazine article, there … Continue reading A competition between integration and workspace
Category: Zeitgeist
The problems with post-empirical science
Jim Baggott has a pretty good piece at Aeon on the problems with post-empirical science. I've highlighted Baggott's views before. Along with others like Sabine Hossenfelder and Peter Woit, he calls attention to a serious issue in physics, the rising acceptance of theories that show little promise of being testable in the foreseeable future. In … Continue reading The problems with post-empirical science
Keith Frankish on the consciousness illusion
Along the lines of last night's post, Keith Frankish has an article at Aeon describing and defending the illusionist viewpoint, that phenomenal consciousness is an illusion. It's an excellent introduction for anyone who isn't familiar with the basic argument. As noted before, I think the illusionists are right about the reality, but I’m not sure … Continue reading Keith Frankish on the consciousness illusion
Is consciousness really a problem?
The Journal of Consciousness Studies has an issue out on the meta-problem of consciousness. (Unfortunately, it's paywalled, so you'll need a subscription, or access to a school network that has one.) As a reminder, there's the hard problem of consciousness, coined by David Chalmers in 1995, which is the question of why or how we … Continue reading Is consciousness really a problem?
The problem of animal minds
Joseph LeDoux has an article at Nautilus on The Tricky Problem with Other Minds. It's an excerpt from his new book, which I'm currently reading. For an idea of the main thesis: The fact that animals can only respond nonverbally means there is no contrasting class of response that can be used to distinguish conscious … Continue reading The problem of animal minds
Machine learning and the need for innate foundations
This interesting Nature article by Anthony M. Zador came up in my Twitter feed: A critique of pure learning and what artificial neural networks can learn from animal brains: Artificial neural networks (ANNs) have undergone a revolution, catalyzed by better supervised learning algorithms. However, in stark contrast to young animals (including humans), training such networks … Continue reading Machine learning and the need for innate foundations
Ginger Campbell is doing a series on consciousness
I've highlighted Dr. Ginger Campbell's excellent Brain Science Podcast before. It's an invaluable resource for anyone interested in the science of the brain. Many of the books and concepts I've highlighted here over the years, I first heard about on her show. Campbell, a medical doctor, pretty much focuses on neuroscience rather than philosophy, but … Continue reading Ginger Campbell is doing a series on consciousness
The reflex and the feeling
Stephen T. Asma and Rami Gabriel have an interesting article at Aeon on emotions. Their main thesis is that many emotions are biological, universal, and rooted in evolution. And that they arise through "the strata of consciousness": the physiological, the experential, and the conceptual. They start off casting aspersions on computationalism, evolutionary psychology, and artificial … Continue reading The reflex and the feeling
The Anthropocene is a conceit of human exceptionalism
Peter Brannen has an interesting piece in the Atlantic, pointing out that the Anthropocene is more of a geological event rather than an epoch, at least so far. Humans are now living in a new geological epoch of our own making: the Anthropocene. Or so we’re told. Whereas some epochs in Earth history stretch more … Continue reading The Anthropocene is a conceit of human exceptionalism
Detecting consciousness in animals and machines, inside-out
An interesting paper came up in my feeds this weekend: Indicators and Criteria of Consciousness in Animals and Intelligent Machines: An Inside-Out Approach. The authors put forth a definition of consciousness, and then criteria to test for it, although they emphasize that these can't be "hard" criteria, just indicators. None of them individually definitely establish … Continue reading Detecting consciousness in animals and machines, inside-out