Experience and behavior

Common Vampire Bat

Is studying conscious experience different from studying behavior? In a number of recent conversations I've had, the distinction between experience and behavior has come up. There's a strong sentiment that we can study behavior scientifically, including all the intermediate mental states that enable it. But experience is seen as something distinct from that, something that … Continue reading Experience and behavior

Illusionism and functionalism

Inverted spectrum: showing one person's perception of a red strawberry equivalent to another's experience of a green one.

In the last thread, someone asked what exactly is it about consciousness that illusionists say is illusory? One quick answer is that for illusionists, the properties people see in experience that incline us to think that consciousness is a metaphysically hard problem, are what's illusory. In weak illusionism, the properties aren't what they seem. In … Continue reading Illusionism and functionalism

Illusionism and types of physicalism

Can we in principle ever deduce the mental from the physical? Christopher Devlin Brown and David Papineau have a new paper out in the Journal of Consciousness Studies titled: Illusionism and A Posteriori Physicalism; No Fact of the Matter. (Note: the link is to a free version.) As the title makes clear, the overall gist … Continue reading Illusionism and types of physicalism

Kingdom of the Planet of the Apes and other TV notes

Poster for Kingdom of the Planet of the Apes

Last week I watched Kingdom of the Planet of the Apes. I've mentioned before that I'm a long term fan of the Planet of the Apes franchise. The reboot film series and its updated imagining of the overall premise have revived the franchise in an impressive manner. The new movies in many ways are very … Continue reading Kingdom of the Planet of the Apes and other TV notes

AI intelligence, consciousness, and sentience

Poster for the movie Ex Machina

Can the possibility of AI consciousness be ruled out? Anil Seth has a new preprint on the question of AI consciousness. Seth is skeptical about AI consciousness, although he admits that he can't rule it out completely. He spends some time attacking computational functionalism, the view that mental states are functional in nature, that they … Continue reading AI intelligence, consciousness, and sentience