Well, I find this a bit disappointing. I was hoping that the contest between global workspace theory (GWT) and integrated information theory (IIT) would be announced sometime this year. Apparently, I'm going to have to wait awhile: Pitts describes the intention of this competition as “to kill one or both theories,” but adds that while … Continue reading The battle between integration and workspace will take a while
Tag: Brain
Daniel Dennett on consciousness and the hard question
This interview is pretty much classic Daniel Dennett. He starts off pointing out that introspection is unreliable, that our beliefs about our inner experience are what need to be explained, not necessarily what the beliefs purport to be reality. He doesn't name the meta-problem, but it's clear that, and related concepts, are what he's talking … Continue reading Daniel Dennett on consciousness and the hard question
A response to the unfolding argument: a defense of Integrated Information Theory
Back in May, I shared a paper that made a blistering attack on the integrated information theory (IIT) of consciousness. A major point of IIT is that a specific causal structure is necessary to generate phenomenal experience, namely a feedback or recurrent neural network, that is, a neural network with structural loops. To be clear, … Continue reading A response to the unfolding argument: a defense of Integrated Information Theory
The issues with higher order theories of consciousness
After the global workspace theory (GWT) post, someone asked me if I'm now down on higher order theories (HOT). It's fair to say I'm less enthusiastic about them than I used to be. They still might describe important components of consciousness, but the stronger assertion that they provide the primary explanation now seems dubious. A … Continue reading The issues with higher order theories of consciousness
Global workspace theory: consciousness as brain wide information sharing
Lately I've been reading up on global workspace theory (GWT). In a survey published last year, among general consciousness enthusiasts, integrated information theory (IIT) was the most popular theory, followed closely by GWT. However, among active consciousness researchers, GWT was seen as the most promising by far (although no theory garnered a majority). Since seeing … Continue reading Global workspace theory: consciousness as brain wide information sharing
The magic step and the crucial fork
Those of you who've known me for a while may remember the long fascination I've had with Michael Graziano's attention schema theory of consciousness. I covered it early in this blog's history and have returned to it multiple times over the years. I still think the theory has a lot going for it, particularly as … Continue reading The magic step and the crucial fork
The layers of emotional feelings
One of the ongoing debates in neuroscience is on the nature of emotions, where they originate, where they are felt, and how innate versus learned they are. One view, championed by the late Jaak Panksepp and his followers, see emotions as innate, primal, and subcortical. They allow that the more complex social emotions, such as … Continue reading The layers of emotional feelings
Debate: Do split-brain patients have two minds?
I went to the NYU Consciousness site this morning hoping to see if the recent debate on the relationship of prefrontal activity to consciousness had been posted yet. It hasn't, and based on what I can see, it might be a while. But I did find this interesting debate from last year on whether split … Continue reading Debate: Do split-brain patients have two minds?
Integrated information theory
I think most of you know I'm not a fan of integrated information theory (IIT). However, it is a theory proposed by scientists, and I've always had a mildly guilty conscience over not having read about it other than through articles and papers. Some years ago, I tried to read Giuilio Tononi's book, PHI: A Voyage … Continue reading Integrated information theory
A standard model of consciousness?
I've often noted that I find more consilience than disagreement between the empirically grounded theories of consciousness. They seem to be looking at the problem at differing levels of organization, and together they may present a growing scientific consensus about how the mind works. In particular, a few weeks ago, when discussing higher order theories, … Continue reading A standard model of consciousness?