The cognitive scientist, Hakwan Lau, whose work I've highlighted several times in the last year, has been pondering illusionism recently. He did a Twitter survey on the relationship between the phenomenal concept strategy (PCS) and illusionism, which inspired my post on the PCS. (Meant to mention that in the post, but it slipped.) Anyway, he's … Continue reading Do qualia exist? Depends on what we mean by “exist.”
Tag: Consciousness
The phenomenal concept strategy and issues with conceptual isolation
I've often pondered that the hard problem of consciousness, the perceived problem of understanding how phenomenal consciousness can happen in physical systems, arises due to the fact that our intuitive model of the phenomenal is very different from our intuitive model of the physical, of the brain in particular. As is usually the case, anytime … Continue reading The phenomenal concept strategy and issues with conceptual isolation
Prefrontal activity associated with the contents of consciousness
The other day I bemoaned the fact that the Templeton competition between global workspace theory (GWT) and integrated information theory (IIT) would take so long, particularly the point about having to wait to see the role of the front and back of the brain in consciousness clarified. Well, it looks like many aren't waiting, and … Continue reading Prefrontal activity associated with the contents of consciousness
Recurrent processing theory and the function of consciousness
Victor Lamme's recurrent processing theory (RPT) remains on the short list of theories considered plausible by the consciousness science community. It's something of a dark horse candidate, without the support of global workspace theory (GWT) or integrated information theory (IIT), but it gets more support among consciousness researchers than among general enthusiasts. The Michael Cohen … Continue reading Recurrent processing theory and the function of consciousness
Is there a conscious perception finish line?
Global workspace theory (GWT) is the proposition that consciousness is composed of contents broadcast throughout the brain. Various specialty processes compete for the limited capacity of the broadcasting mechanisms, to have their content broadcast to the all the other specialty processes. Global neuronal workspace (GNW) is a variant of that theory, popularly promoted by Stanislas … Continue reading Is there a conscious perception finish line?
For animal consciousness, is there a fact of the matter?
Peter Carruthers has been blogging this week on the thesis of his new book, Human and Animal Minds: The Consciousness Question Laid to Rest. I mentioned Carruthers' book in my post on global workspace theory (GWT), but didn't get into the details. While I had been considering taking a fresh look at GWT, his book … Continue reading For animal consciousness, is there a fact of the matter?
Peter Carruthers on the problems of consciousness
Peter Carruthers is posting this week at The Brains Blog on his new book, Human and Animal Minds, which I mentioned in my post on global workspace theory. His first post focuses on two issues: latent dualism and terminological confusion. I think he's right on both counts. On the latent dualism issue, I'm reminded of … Continue reading Peter Carruthers on the problems of consciousness
The battle between integration and workspace will take a while
Well, I find this a bit disappointing. I was hoping that the contest between global workspace theory (GWT) and integrated information theory (IIT) would be announced sometime this year. Apparently, I'm going to have to wait awhile: Pitts describes the intention of this competition as “to kill one or both theories,” but adds that while … Continue reading The battle between integration and workspace will take a while
Daniel Dennett on consciousness and the hard question
This interview is pretty much classic Daniel Dennett. He starts off pointing out that introspection is unreliable, that our beliefs about our inner experience are what need to be explained, not necessarily what the beliefs purport to be reality. He doesn't name the meta-problem, but it's clear that, and related concepts, are what he's talking … Continue reading Daniel Dennett on consciousness and the hard question
A response to the unfolding argument: a defense of Integrated Information Theory
Back in May, I shared a paper that made a blistering attack on the integrated information theory (IIT) of consciousness. A major point of IIT is that a specific causal structure is necessary to generate phenomenal experience, namely a feedback or recurrent neural network, that is, a neural network with structural loops. To be clear, … Continue reading A response to the unfolding argument: a defense of Integrated Information Theory
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