Tag: Consciousness

The difficulty of isolating evidence for the location of consciousness

In the ongoing debate in neuroscience between those who see consciousness being in the back part of the brain, among the sensory processing regions, or in the front of the brain, in the cognitive action planning regions, there are issues confounding the evidence.  Most experiments testing for conscious perception depend on self report from the … Continue reading The difficulty of isolating evidence for the location of consciousness →

Angst over mini-brains

Organoids, the small pieces of neural tissue grown from stem cells, dubbed "mini-brains", and used in research, have been getting a lot of attention lately.  Apparently a few neuroscientists are concerned that the organoids might be sentient, and suffering as experiments are performed on them.  There's growing concern that implanting human mini-brains in animal brains … Continue reading Angst over mini-brains →

Michael Graziano on mind uploading

Michael Graziano has an article at The Guardian, which feels like an excerpt from his new book, exploring what might happen if we can upload minds: Imagine that a person’s brain could be scanned in great detail and recreated in a computer simulation. The person’s mind and memories, emotions and personality would be duplicated. In … Continue reading Michael Graziano on mind uploading →

A competition between integration and workspace

Back in March, I did a post on a proposed Templeton Foundation project to test major scientific theories of consciousness.  The idea was to start with a head to head competition between the integration information theory (IIT) and global workspace theory (GWT).  Apparently that project got funded and, according to a Science Magazine article, there … Continue reading A competition between integration and workspace →

A standard model of consciousness?

I've often noted that I find more consilience than disagreement between the empirically grounded theories of consciousness.  They seem to be looking at the problem at differing levels of organization, and together they may present a growing scientific consensus about how the mind works. In particular, a few weeks ago, when discussing higher order theories, … Continue reading A standard model of consciousness? →

Keith Frankish on the consciousness illusion

Along the lines of last night's post, Keith Frankish has an article at Aeon describing and defending the illusionist viewpoint, that phenomenal consciousness is an illusion.  It's an excellent introduction for anyone who isn't familiar with the basic argument. As noted before, I think the illusionists are right about the reality, but I’m not sure … Continue reading Keith Frankish on the consciousness illusion →

A correction: LeDoux’s actual views on instrumental learning in vertebrates

I have to make a correction.  In my post on LeDoux's views on consciousness and emotions, I made the following statement: Anyway, LeDoux states that there is “no convincing” evidence for instrumental behavior in pre-mammalian vertebrates, or in invertebrates.  In his view, instrumental behavior only exists in mammals and birds. As it turns out, this … Continue reading A correction: LeDoux’s actual views on instrumental learning in vertebrates →

Layers of consciousness, September 2019 edition

A couple of years ago, when writing about panpsychism, I introduced a five layer conception of consciousness.  The idea back then was to show a couple of things. One was that very simple conceptions of consciousness, such as interactions with the environment, were missing a lot of capabilities that we intuitively think of as belonging … Continue reading Layers of consciousness, September 2019 edition →