Tag: Consciousness

Consciousness science undetermined

An interesting paper by Matthias Michel on the underdetermined nature of theories of consciousness. Consciousness scientists have not reached consensus on two of the most central questions in their field: first, on whether consciousness overflows reportability; second, on the physical basis of consciousness. I review the scientific literature of the 19th century to provide evidence … Continue reading Consciousness science undetermined →

Rule out plant consciousness for the right reasons

In recent years, there's been a resurgence in the old romantic sentiment that maybe plants are conscious.  I hadn't realized that an entire sub-field had formed called Plant Neurobiology, the name itself incorporating a dubious claim that plants have neurons.  Although later renamed to the more cautious Plant Signalling and Behavior, it's reportedly still popularly … Continue reading Rule out plant consciousness for the right reasons →

The ASSC 23 debate on whether artificial intelligence can be conscious

The ASSC (Association of Scientific Study of Consciousness) had its annual conference on consciousness this week, which culminated in a debate on whether AI can be conscious. Note: the event doesn't actually start until the 28:30 minute mark.  The remaining part is about 99 minutes long. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=97z0OmpTs-Q I was delighted to see the discussion immediately … Continue reading The ASSC 23 debate on whether artificial intelligence can be conscious →

Empirical vs Fundamental IIT and the benefits of instrumentalism

The other day, when discussing a paper that criticized IIT (the Integrated Information Theory of consciousness) as unscientific, I noted that IIT, while questionable as the ultimate answer for consciousness, could be useful in the more limited capacity of distinguishing degrees of consciousness in a brain.  Apparently I'm not the only one who thinks that, … Continue reading Empirical vs Fundamental IIT and the benefits of instrumentalism →

Dehaene’s global neuronal workspace theory

I just finished reading Stanislas Dehaene's Consciousness and the Brain.  Dehaene is a French psychologist and cognitive neuroscientist who is bullish on the idea of consciousness being something that can be scientifically investigated.  It's an interesting book, one that I recommend for anyone interested in the science of consciousness. Dehaene accomplishes his scientific investigation by … Continue reading Dehaene’s global neuronal workspace theory →

What is it about phenomenal consciousness that’s so mysterious?

I learned something new this week about the online magazine The Conversation.  A number of their articles that are shared around don't show up in their RSS feeds or site navigation.  It appears these articles only come up in searches, although it's possible they show in in the site's email newsletter, which I'm not subscribed … Continue reading What is it about phenomenal consciousness that’s so mysterious? →

The sparsity of phenomenal consciousness, or of cognition, or both

Ned Block gave a Google talk (embedded below) that was ostensibly supposed to be about why AI approaches to cognition won't work.  However, while he does address this topic briefly, it's toward the end and he admits he hasn't really justified it, beyond a vague proposition that while access consciousness involves information processing, maybe phenomenal … Continue reading The sparsity of phenomenal consciousness, or of cognition, or both →

The unfolding argument: why Integrated Information Theory is not scientific

There's an interesting new paper in Consciousness and Cognition on why causal theories such as IIT (integrated information theory) or RPT (recurrent processing theory) aren't scientific: How can we explain consciousness? This question has become a vibrant topic of neuroscience research in recent decades. A large body of empirical results has been accumulated, and many … Continue reading The unfolding argument: why Integrated Information Theory is not scientific →