Ponderings of science, philosophy, history, society, and many other topics
A new paper is been getting some attention. It makes the case for biological computation. (This is a link to a summary, but there's a link to the actual paper at the bottom of that article.) Characterizing the debate between computational functionalism and biological naturalism as camps that are hopelessly dug in, the authors propose … Continue reading Biological computation and the nature of software
The SEP article on scientific reductionism notes that the etymology of the word "reduction" is "to bring back" something to something else. So in a methodological sense, reduction is bringing one theory or ontology back to a simpler or more fundamental theory or ontology. The Wikipedia entry on reductionism identifies different kinds: ontological, methodological, and … Continue reading Why I’m a reductionist
I recently discovered the new TV show Pluribus, about a scenario where the whole world gets turned into a hive mind, an annoyingly nice one, at least in the initial episodes, but where a few humans turn out to be immune to the virus that converts everyone else, including the cantankerous protagonist, Carol Sturka. The … Continue reading Maybe we’re already part of a hive mind
Nature has an article noting that language models have killed "the Turing test" and asking if we even need a replacement. I think the article makes some good points. But a lot of the people quoted seem to take the opportunity to dismiss Turing's whole idea. I think this is a mistake. First, we need … Continue reading Why I still think Turing’s insight matters
Ned Block has a new paper out, for which he shared a time limited link on Bluesky. He argues in the paper that the "meat neutral" computational functionalism inherent in many theories of consciousness neglect what he sees as a compelling alternative: that the subcomputational biological realizers underlying computational processes in the brain are necessary … Continue reading Does consciousness require biology?
In 1974, in a landmark paper, Thomas Nagel asks what it's like to be a bat. He argues that we can never know. I've expressed my skepticism about the phrase "what it's like" or "something it is like" before, and that skepticism still stands. I think a lot of people nod at it, seeing it … Continue reading What is it like to be you?
I'm a functionalist. I think the mind and consciousness is about what the brain does, rather than its particular composition, or some other attribute. Which means that if another system did the same or similar things, it would make sense to say it was conscious. Consciousness is as consciousness does. Functionalism has some advantages over … Continue reading What is a non-functional account of consciousness supposed to be?
Annaka Harris has a new audio book out which she is promoting. I haven't listened to it, but based on the interviews and spots like the one below, it appears that she's doubling down on the conclusions she reached in her book from a few years ago, that consciousness is fundamental and pervasive. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nP2swgDVl5M The … Continue reading Reducing felt experience requires not preemptively dismissing the solutions
As a computational functionalist, I think the mind is a system that exists in this universe and operates according to the laws of physics. Which means that, in principle, there shouldn't be any reason why the information and dispositions that make up a mind can't be recorded and copied into another substrate someday, such as … Continue reading Mind uploading and continuity
Nicolas Rouleau and Michael Levin have a new preprint out: Brains and Where Else? Mapping Theories of Consciousness to Unconventional Embodiments. The gist of the paper is that we should be open to seeing consciousness in places other than brains. While I'm onboard with that general premise, they take it to places that don't seem … Continue reading Fundamental and naturalistic panpsychism
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