Tag: Philosophy of Mind

The issues with higher order theories of consciousness

After the global workspace theory (GWT) post, someone asked me if I'm now down on higher order theories (HOT).  It's fair to say I'm less enthusiastic about them than I used to be.  They still might describe important components of consciousness, but the stronger assertion that they provide the primary explanation now seems dubious. A … Continue reading The issues with higher order theories of consciousness →

Global workspace theory: consciousness as brain wide information sharing

Lately I've been reading up on global workspace theory (GWT).  In a survey published last year, among general consciousness enthusiasts, integrated information theory (IIT) was the most popular theory, followed closely by GWT.  However, among active consciousness researchers, GWT was seen as the most promising by far (although no theory garnered a majority).  Since seeing … Continue reading Global workspace theory: consciousness as brain wide information sharing →

Massimo on consciousness: no illusion, but also no spookiness

Massimo Pigliucci has a good article on consciousness at Aeon.  In it, he takes aim both at illusionists as well as those who claim consciousness is outside the purview of science.  Although I'd say he's more worked up about the illusionists. However, rather than taking the typical path of strawmanning the claim, he deals with … Continue reading Massimo on consciousness: no illusion, but also no spookiness →

The problems with the Chinese room argument

In 1950, Alan Turing published a seminal paper on machine intelligence (which is available online).  Turing ponders whether machines can think.  However, he pretty much immediately abandons this initial question as hopelessly metaphysical and replaces it with another question that can be approached scientifically: can a machine ever convince us that it's thinking? Turing posits … Continue reading The problems with the Chinese room argument →

Keith Frankish on the consciousness illusion

Along the lines of last night's post, Keith Frankish has an article at Aeon describing and defending the illusionist viewpoint, that phenomenal consciousness is an illusion.  It's an excellent introduction for anyone who isn't familiar with the basic argument. As noted before, I think the illusionists are right about the reality, but I’m not sure … Continue reading Keith Frankish on the consciousness illusion →

Ginger Campbell is doing a series on consciousness

I've highlighted Dr. Ginger Campbell's excellent Brain Science Podcast before.  It's an invaluable resource for anyone interested in the science of the brain.  Many of the books and concepts I've highlighted here over the years, I first heard about on her show.  Campbell, a medical doctor, pretty much focuses on neuroscience rather than philosophy, but … Continue reading Ginger Campbell is doing a series on consciousness →

The problems with panpsychism

Late last week, there was a clash between philosophers on Twitter over panpsychism.  This was followed by Philip Goff, an outspoken proponent of panpsychism, authoring a blog post arguing that we shouldn't require evidence for it.  This week, Susan Schneider did a (somewhat confusing) Big Think video arguing that panpsychism isn't compatible with physics, and … Continue reading The problems with panpsychism →