In recent years, there's been a resurgence in the old romantic sentiment that maybe plants are conscious. I hadn't realized that an entire sub-field had formed called Plant Neurobiology, the name itself incorporating a dubious claim that plants have neurons. Although later renamed to the more cautious Plant Signalling and Behavior, it's reportedly still popularly … Continue reading Rule out plant consciousness for the right reasons
Tag: Philosophy of Mind
The ASSC 23 debate on whether artificial intelligence can be conscious
The ASSC (Association of Scientific Study of Consciousness) had its annual conference on consciousness this week, which culminated in a debate on whether AI can be conscious. Note: the event doesn't actually start until the 28:30 minute mark. The remaining part is about 99 minutes long. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=97z0OmpTs-Q I was delighted to see the discussion immediately … Continue reading The ASSC 23 debate on whether artificial intelligence can be conscious
The sparsity of phenomenal consciousness, or of cognition, or both
Ned Block gave a Google talk (embedded below) that was ostensibly supposed to be about why AI approaches to cognition won't work. However, while he does address this topic briefly, it's toward the end and he admits he hasn't really justified it, beyond a vague proposition that while access consciousness involves information processing, maybe phenomenal … Continue reading The sparsity of phenomenal consciousness, or of cognition, or both
Are zombies conscious?
This is not a question about philosophical zombies. I did a post on them a while back. (The TL;DR is that I find that whole concept ranges from incoherent to dubious, depending on the exact version.) This post is on the zombies we see in fiction, such as Night of the Living Dead, the Resident … Continue reading Are zombies conscious?
Emotions, feelings, and action programs
Sean Carroll's latest Mindscape podcast features an interview with neuroscientist Antonio Damasio: When we talk about the mind, we are constantly talking about consciousness and cognition. Antonio Damasio wants us to talk about our feelings. But it’s not in an effort to be more touchy-feely; Damasio, one of the world’s leading neuroscientists, believes that feelings … Continue reading Emotions, feelings, and action programs
Do boiling crawfish suffer?
Recently I visited one of my cousins and, as is tradition for a lot of people this time of year, we had a crawfish boil. Eating boiled crawfish (crayfish for you non-Cajuns) is an ever present activity in southern Louisiana, at least when they're in season, and I've had my share over the years. Although … Continue reading Do boiling crawfish suffer?
The brain is a computer, but what is a computer?
Kevin Lande has an article up at Aeon which is one of the best discussions of the brain as a computational system that I've seen in a while. For an idea of the spirit of the piece: The claim that the brain is a computer is not merely a metaphor – but it is not … Continue reading The brain is a computer, but what is a computer?
SMBC on what separates humans from machines
Source: Saturday Morning Breakfast Cereal (Click through for full sized version and the red button caption.) My own take on this is that what separates humans from machines is our survival instinct. We intensely desire to survive, and procreate. Machines, by and large, don't. At least they won't unless we design them to. If we … Continue reading SMBC on what separates humans from machines
A neuroscience showdown on consciousness?
Apparently the Templeton Foundation is interested in seeing progress on consciousness science, and so is contemplating funding studies to test various theories. The stated idea is to at least winnow the field through “structured adversarial collaborations”. The first two theories proposed to be tested are Global Workspace Theory (GWT) and Integrated Information Theory (IIT). GWT … Continue reading A neuroscience showdown on consciousness?
Why we’ll know AI is conscious before it will
At Nautilus, Joel Frohlich posits how we'll know when an AI is conscious. He starts off by accepting David Chalmers' concept of a philosophical zombie, but then makes this statement. But I have a slight problem with Chalmers’ zombies. Zombies are supposed to be capable of asking any question about the nature of experience. It’s worth … Continue reading Why we’ll know AI is conscious before it will