Philosopher Eric Schwitzgebel has an interesting post up criticizing the arguments of illusionists, those who have concluded that phenomenal consciousness is an illusion. Here's a way to deny the existence of things of Type X. Assume that things of Type X must have Property A, and then argue that nothing has Property A. If that … Continue reading Inflate and explode, or deflate and preserve?
Tag: Philosophy
What is knowledge?
In the discussion on the last post on measurement, the definition of knowledge came up a few times. That's dredged up long standing thoughts I have about knowledge, which I've discussed with some of you before, but that I don't think I've ever actually put in a post. The ancient classic definition of knowledge is … Continue reading What is knowledge?
Are there things that are knowable but not measurable?
It's a mantra for many scientists, not to mention many business managers, that if you can't measure it, it's not real. On the other hand, I've been told by a lot of people, mostly non-scientists, and occasionally humanistic scholars including philosophers, that not everything knowable is measurable. But what exactly is a measurement? My intuitive understanding … Continue reading Are there things that are knowable but not measurable?
What about subjective experience implies anything non-physical?
Mary's room is a classic philosophical thought experiment about consciousness. The Wikipedia article on what's called the knowledge argument quotes Frank Jackson, the originator of the argument, as follows: Mary is a brilliant scientist who is, for whatever reason, forced to investigate the world from a black and white room via a black and white … Continue reading What about subjective experience implies anything non-physical?
What do scientific theories actually tell us about the world?
One of the things that's exciting about learning new things, is that often a new understanding in one area sheds light on what might seem like a completely separate topic. For me, information about how the brain works appears to have shed new light on a question in the philosophy of of science, where there has long … Continue reading What do scientific theories actually tell us about the world?
A possible answer to the hard problem of consciousness: subjective experience is communication
In 1995, David Chalmers coined the "hard problem of consciousness": It is undeniable that some organisms are subjects of experience. But the question of how it is that these systems are subjects of experience is perplexing. Why is it that when our cognitive systems engage in visual and auditory information-processing, we have visual or auditory … Continue reading A possible answer to the hard problem of consciousness: subjective experience is communication
The illusion of phenomenal consciousness?
Philosopher Peter Hankins at Conscious Entities has a write-up on the November 12 issue of the JCS (Journal of Consciousness Studies) in which philosophers, psychologists, and neuroscientists such as Keith Frankish, Daniel Dennett, Susan Blackmore, and Michael Graziano, debate whether it makes sense to refer to phenomenal consciousness as an illusion. Unfortunately the full text of the … Continue reading The illusion of phenomenal consciousness?
Is consciousness a simulation engine, a prediction machine?
Back in September (which now seems like a million years ago), I did a series of posts on consciousness inspired by Todd Feinberg and Jon Mallatt’s recent book, ‘The Ancient Origins of Consciousness: How the Brain Created Experience‘. In that series, I explored consciousness as a system modeling its environment and itself as a guide to … Continue reading Is consciousness a simulation engine, a prediction machine?
The problems with philosophical zombies
In any online conversation about consciousness, sooner or later someone is going to bring up philosophical zombies as an argument for consciousness being non-physical, or at least some portion of it. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy introduces the p-zombie concept as follows: Zombies in philosophy are imaginary creatures designed to illuminate problems about consciousness and its relation … Continue reading The problems with philosophical zombies
The range of conscious systems and the hard problem
This is the fifth and final post in a series inspired by Todd Feinberg and Jon Mallatt's new book, 'The Ancient Origins of Consciousness: How the Brain Created Experience'. The previous posts were: What counts as consciousness? Predators and the rise of sensory consciousness Types of sensory consciousness The neural mechanics of sensory consciousness In the … Continue reading The range of conscious systems and the hard problem
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