On occasion, I've been accused of being closed-minded. (Shocking, I know.) Frequently the reason is not seriously considering non-physical propositions, a perception of rigid physicalism. However, as I've noted before, I'm actually not entirely comfortable with the "physicalist" label (or "materialist", or other synonyms or near synonyms). While it's fairly accurate as to my working … Continue reading Platonism and the non-physical
Mary's room is a classic philosophical thought experiment about consciousness. The Wikipedia article on what's called the knowledge argument quotes Frank Jackson, the originator of the argument, as follows: Mary is a brilliant scientist who is, for whatever reason, forced to investigate the world from a black and white room via a black and white … Continue reading What about subjective experience implies anything non-physical?
In the last post, I pondered what distinction between the physical and non-physical, noting that I've historically resisted the label of "physicalist" or "materialist" maintaining that, if any evidence for the non-physical ever did become available, I'd accept its existence. I finished my post asking what that evidence might look like? And if even asking … Continue reading What would evidence for the non-physical look like? A possible answer.
One label that often gets applied to me is "materialist", or sometimes "physicalist." It's a label that, while it probably gives an accurate idea of my conception of reality, I've generally resisted. Why? Because if there were ever any evidence for anything non-physical, I would accept its existence. Consequently, I've often felt that a better label … Continue reading What is physicalism?