A basic question on the black hole information paradox

Image of black hole

The black hole information paradox has been receiving some attention lately. This is the fact that information, that is any pattern of matter, that falls into a black hole is completely crushed as it approaches the singularity, losing whatever differentiation it might have had before. This has long been recognized as a problem, because in … Continue reading A basic question on the black hole information paradox

The iron rule of science?

I'm always interested in new takes on the demarcation between science and non-science, so after seeing the New Yorker write up on Michael Strevens' new book, The Knowledge Machine: How Irrationality Created Modern Science, it seemed like something I needed to read. Strevens begins by examining the two leading theories of science: Karl Popper's falsifiability … Continue reading The iron rule of science?

David Deutsch’s version of many worlds

Schrodinger's cat in many worlds

I've written about the bizarre nature of quantum physics many times, providing a lightning primer back in May on three major interpretations: Copenhagen, pilot-wave, and many worlds.  The many worlds interpretation (MWI) is often summarily dismissed by people, often along with visceral shudders or high doses of outrage.  I understand the discomfort.  When I first … Continue reading David Deutsch’s version of many worlds

The mechanical philosophy and mysterianism

Noam Chomsky published an essay on his web site a few years ago: Science, Mind, and Limits of Understanding.  Chomsky's thesis is that there are areas of reality that science is simply incapable of understanding.  He uses as his principle example, the case of Isaac Newton's understanding of gravity. Chomsky acknowledges that this is a … Continue reading The mechanical philosophy and mysterianism

Hard criteria for theories of consciousness?

(Warning: consciousness theory weeds.) A new paper in the journal Cognitive Neuroscience: Hard criteria for empirical theories of consciousness, takes a shot at proposing criteria for assessing scientific theories of consciousness.  The authors make clear at the beginning that they're aiming their criteria at empirical theories, rather than metaphysical ones.  So they make no attempt … Continue reading Hard criteria for theories of consciousness?