As I indicated in the Chalmers post last week, phenomenal consciousness has been on my mind lately. In the last few days, a couple of my fellow bloggers, Wyrd Smythe and James Cross, have joined in with their own posts. We've had a lot of interesting discussions. But it always comes back to the core … Continue reading The difficulty of subjective experience
Ever since sharing Ned Block's talk on it, phenomenal consciousness has been on my mind. This week, I decided I needed to go back to the main spokesperson for the issue of subjective experience, David Chalmers, and his seminal paper Facing Up to the Problem of Consciousness. I have to admit I've skimmed this paper … Continue reading Chalmers’ theory of consciousness
There's an interesting debate going on among some neuroscientists about which parts of the brain are involved in subjective experience. On the one side are Christof Koch, Giuilio Tononi, and colleagues who argue that consciousness exists wholly in the back of the brain, that the frontal structures are not involved. On the other side are neuroscientists … Continue reading Is consciousness only in the back of the brain?
Mary's room is a classic philosophical thought experiment about consciousness. The Wikipedia article on what's called the knowledge argument quotes Frank Jackson, the originator of the argument, as follows: Mary is a brilliant scientist who is, for whatever reason, forced to investigate the world from a black and white room via a black and white … Continue reading What about subjective experience implies anything non-physical?
In 1995, David Chalmers coined the "hard problem of consciousness": It is undeniable that some organisms are subjects of experience. But the question of how it is that these systems are subjects of experience is perplexing. Why is it that when our cognitive systems engage in visual and auditory information-processing, we have visual or auditory … Continue reading A possible answer to the hard problem of consciousness: subjective experience is communication