Month: January 2020

Prefrontal activity associated with the contents of consciousness

The other day I bemoaned the fact that the Templeton competition between global workspace theory (GWT) and integrated information theory (IIT) would take so long, particularly the point about having to wait to see the role of the front and back of the brain in consciousness clarified.  Well, it looks like many aren't waiting, and … Continue reading Prefrontal activity associated with the contents of consciousness →

Recurrent processing theory and the function of consciousness

Victor Lamme's recurrent processing theory (RPT) remains on the short list of theories considered plausible by the consciousness science community.  It's something of a dark horse candidate, without the support of global workspace theory (GWT) or integrated information theory (IIT), but it gets more support among consciousness researchers than among general enthusiasts.  The Michael Cohen … Continue reading Recurrent processing theory and the function of consciousness →

Stephen Macknik’s work on prosthetic vision

This is pretty wild.  In her latest Brain Science podcast, Ginger Campbell interviews Stephen Macknik on his work to develop a visual replacement implant for blind people.  For a quick overview, check out this short video. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TiA1W1OnU9c One question Campbell asks, that I was wondering myself: how does the light reach the neurons in the … Continue reading Stephen Macknik’s work on prosthetic vision →

Is there a conscious perception finish line?

Global workspace theory (GWT) is the proposition that consciousness is composed of contents broadcast throughout the brain.  Various specialty processes compete for the limited capacity of the broadcasting mechanisms, to have their content broadcast to the all the other specialty processes. Global neuronal workspace (GNW) is a variant of that theory, popularly promoted by Stanislas … Continue reading Is there a conscious perception finish line? →

For animal consciousness, is there a fact of the matter?

Peter Carruthers has been blogging this week on the thesis of his new book, Human and Animal Minds: The Consciousness Question Laid to Rest.  I mentioned Carruthers' book in my post on global workspace theory (GWT), but didn't get into the details.  While I had been considering taking a fresh look at GWT, his book … Continue reading For animal consciousness, is there a fact of the matter? →

Peter Carruthers on the problems of consciousness

Peter Carruthers is posting this week at The Brains Blog on his new book, Human and Animal Minds, which I mentioned in my post on global workspace theory.  His first post focuses on two issues: latent dualism and terminological confusion. I think he's right on both counts.  On the latent dualism issue, I'm reminded of … Continue reading Peter Carruthers on the problems of consciousness →

The battle between integration and workspace will take a while

Well, I find this a bit disappointing.  I was hoping that the contest between global workspace theory (GWT) and integrated information theory (IIT) would be announced sometime this year.  Apparently, I'm going to have to wait awhile: Pitts describes the intention of this competition as “to kill one or both theories,” but adds that while … Continue reading The battle between integration and workspace will take a while →

Daniel Dennett on consciousness and the hard question

This interview is pretty much classic Daniel Dennett.  He starts off pointing out that introspection is unreliable, that our beliefs about our inner experience are what need to be explained, not necessarily what the beliefs purport to be reality.  He doesn't name the meta-problem, but it's clear that, and related concepts, are what he's talking … Continue reading Daniel Dennett on consciousness and the hard question →