I've only recently discovered Ricardo Lopes and his interviews of all kinds of interesting people. Here is one from a couple of years ago of Keith Frankish, the most prominent contemporary champion of illusionism, the idea that phenomenal consciousness is an illusion, that it doesn't exist, and much of this is him giving the standard … Continue reading The necessity of weak emergence
Tag: access consciousness
There is no phenomenality without access
How do we know whether any particular system is conscious? In humans, we typically know because most humans can talk about their conscious experience. Historically, if we can report on it, it's conscious; if we can't, it's in the unconscious. But this raises a difficulty for any entity that doesn't have language, including non-human animals, … Continue reading There is no phenomenality without access
Subjective report doesn’t support the idea that phenomenal consciousness is separate from access consciousness
One of the current debates in consciousness research is whether phenomenal consciousness is something separate and apart from access consciousness. Access consciousness (A-consciousness) is generally defined as perceptions being accessible for reasoning, action decisions, and communication. Phenomenal consciousness (P-consciousness) is seen as raw experience, the "something it is like" aspect of consciousness. Most researchers accept … Continue reading Subjective report doesn’t support the idea that phenomenal consciousness is separate from access consciousness
Daniel Dennett on why phenomenal consciousness is access consciousness
This old talk by Daniel Dennett touches on a lot of topics we've discussed recently. Dennett explains why it's wrong to regard phenomenal consciousness (the "what it's likeness" or "raw experience" version) as separate from access consciousness (the cognitive access of information for decision making, memory, report, etc). Note that Dennett doesn't deny the existence … Continue reading Daniel Dennett on why phenomenal consciousness is access consciousness
Massimo on consciousness: no illusion, but also no spookiness
Massimo Pigliucci has a good article on consciousness at Aeon. In it, he takes aim both at illusionists as well as those who claim consciousness is outside the purview of science. Although I'd say he's more worked up about the illusionists. However, rather than taking the typical path of strawmanning the claim, he deals with … Continue reading Massimo on consciousness: no illusion, but also no spookiness
The reflex and the feeling
Stephen T. Asma and Rami Gabriel have an interesting article at Aeon on emotions. Their main thesis is that many emotions are biological, universal, and rooted in evolution. And that they arise through "the strata of consciousness": the physiological, the experential, and the conceptual. They start off casting aspersions on computationalism, evolutionary psychology, and artificial … Continue reading The reflex and the feeling
Dehaene’s global neuronal workspace theory
I just finished reading Stanislas Dehaene's Consciousness and the Brain. Dehaene is a French psychologist and cognitive neuroscientist who is bullish on the idea of consciousness being something that can be scientifically investigated. It's an interesting book, one that I recommend for anyone interested in the science of consciousness. Dehaene accomplishes his scientific investigation by … Continue reading Dehaene’s global neuronal workspace theory
What is it about phenomenal consciousness that’s so mysterious?
I learned something new this week about the online magazine The Conversation. A number of their articles that are shared around don't show up in their RSS feeds or site navigation. It appears these articles only come up in searches, although it's possible they show in in the site's email newsletter, which I'm not subscribed … Continue reading What is it about phenomenal consciousness that’s so mysterious?
The sparsity of phenomenal consciousness, or of cognition, or both
Ned Block gave a Google talk (embedded below) that was ostensibly supposed to be about why AI approaches to cognition won't work. However, while he does address this topic briefly, it's toward the end and he admits he hasn't really justified it, beyond a vague proposition that while access consciousness involves information processing, maybe phenomenal … Continue reading The sparsity of phenomenal consciousness, or of cognition, or both
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