(Warning: neuroscience weeds) Recently I noted that one of the current debates in cognitive science is between those who see phenomenal and access consciousness as separate things, and those who see them as different aspects of the same thing. Closely related, perhaps actually identical, is the debate between local and global theories of consciousness. Local … Continue reading Postdictive perception and the consciousness finish line
Tag: Brain
Final thoughts on The Evolution of the Sensitive Soul
This is the final post in a series I've been doing on Simona Ginsburg and Eva Jablonka’s book: The Evolution of the Sensitive Soul, a book focused on the evolution of minimal consciousness. This is a large book, and it covers a wide range of ideas. A series of relatively small blog posts can't do them … Continue reading Final thoughts on The Evolution of the Sensitive Soul
The seven attributes of minimal consciousness
I'm still working my way through Simona Ginsburg and Eva Jablonka's tome: The Evolution of the Sensitive Soul. This is the second post of a series on their book. I'm actually on the last chapter, but that last chapter is close to a hundred pages long, and the book's prose is dense. Light reading it … Continue reading The seven attributes of minimal consciousness
The sensitive soul and the rational soul
I think examining the evolution of consciousness in animals helps shed light on it in humans. Admittedly, there are difficulties. Animals can't self report using language, which limits just how much of their experience can be garnered from experiments. Still, taking data from human studies and combining it with animal studies can provide a lot … Continue reading The sensitive soul and the rational soul
The response schema
Several months ago Michael Graziano, and colleagues, attempted a synthesis of three families of scientific theories of consciousness: global workspace theory (GWT), higher order theory (HOT), and his own attention schema theory (AST). A quick (crudely simplistic) reminder: GWT posits that content becomes conscious when it is globally broadcast throughout the brain, HOT when a … Continue reading The response schema
Islands of awareness
(Warning: neuroscience weeds) An interesting paper by Tim Bayne, Anil Seth, and Marcello Massimi, which came up in my Twitter stream today, asks whether there can be islands of awareness. Ordinary consciousness involves ongoing interaction with the environment, receiving sensory information, and producing motor output. It has a functional role, enabling an organism to deal … Continue reading Islands of awareness
Recurrent processing theory and the function of consciousness
Victor Lamme's recurrent processing theory (RPT) remains on the short list of theories considered plausible by the consciousness science community. It's something of a dark horse candidate, without the support of global workspace theory (GWT) or integrated information theory (IIT), but it gets more support among consciousness researchers than among general enthusiasts. The Michael Cohen … Continue reading Recurrent processing theory and the function of consciousness
Is there a conscious perception finish line?
Global workspace theory (GWT) is the proposition that consciousness is composed of contents broadcast throughout the brain. Various specialty processes compete for the limited capacity of the broadcasting mechanisms, to have their content broadcast to the all the other specialty processes. Global neuronal workspace (GNW) is a variant of that theory, popularly promoted by Stanislas … Continue reading Is there a conscious perception finish line?
For animal consciousness, is there a fact of the matter?
Peter Carruthers has been blogging this week on the thesis of his new book, Human and Animal Minds: The Consciousness Question Laid to Rest. I mentioned Carruthers' book in my post on global workspace theory (GWT), but didn't get into the details. While I had been considering taking a fresh look at GWT, his book … Continue reading For animal consciousness, is there a fact of the matter?
Peter Carruthers on the problems of consciousness
Peter Carruthers is posting this week at The Brains Blog on his new book, Human and Animal Minds, which I mentioned in my post on global workspace theory. His first post focuses on two issues: latent dualism and terminological confusion. I think he's right on both counts. On the latent dualism issue, I'm reminded of … Continue reading Peter Carruthers on the problems of consciousness