I have to make a correction. In my post on LeDoux's views on consciousness and emotions, I made the following statement: Anyway, LeDoux states that there is “no convincing” evidence for instrumental behavior in pre-mammalian vertebrates, or in invertebrates. In his view, instrumental behavior only exists in mammals and birds. As it turns out, this … Continue reading A correction: LeDoux’s actual views on instrumental learning in vertebrates
Tag: Brain
Layers of consciousness, September 2019 edition
A couple of years ago, when writing about panpsychism, I introduced a five layer conception of consciousness. The idea back then was to show a couple of things. One was that very simple conceptions of consciousness, such as interactions with the environment, were missing a lot of capabilities that we intuitively think of as belonging … Continue reading Layers of consciousness, September 2019 edition
Joseph LeDoux’s theories on consciousness and emotions
In the last post, I mentioned that I was reading Joseph LeDoux's new book, The Deep History of Ourselves: The Four-Billion-Year Story of How We Got Conscious Brains. There's a lot of interesting stuff in this book. As its title implies, it starts early in evolution, providing a lot of information on early life, although … Continue reading Joseph LeDoux’s theories on consciousness and emotions
The problem of animal minds
Joseph LeDoux has an article at Nautilus on The Tricky Problem with Other Minds. It's an excerpt from his new book, which I'm currently reading. For an idea of the main thesis: The fact that animals can only respond nonverbally means there is no contrasting class of response that can be used to distinguish conscious … Continue reading The problem of animal minds
Machine learning and the need for innate foundations
This interesting Nature article by Anthony M. Zador came up in my Twitter feed: A critique of pure learning and what artificial neural networks can learn from animal brains: Artificial neural networks (ANNs) have undergone a revolution, catalyzed by better supervised learning algorithms. However, in stark contrast to young animals (including humans), training such networks … Continue reading Machine learning and the need for innate foundations
Ginger Campbell is doing a series on consciousness
I've highlighted Dr. Ginger Campbell's excellent Brain Science Podcast before. It's an invaluable resource for anyone interested in the science of the brain. Many of the books and concepts I've highlighted here over the years, I first heard about on her show. Campbell, a medical doctor, pretty much focuses on neuroscience rather than philosophy, but … Continue reading Ginger Campbell is doing a series on consciousness
The reflex and the feeling
Stephen T. Asma and Rami Gabriel have an interesting article at Aeon on emotions. Their main thesis is that many emotions are biological, universal, and rooted in evolution. And that they arise through "the strata of consciousness": the physiological, the experential, and the conceptual. They start off casting aspersions on computationalism, evolutionary psychology, and artificial … Continue reading The reflex and the feeling
Detecting consciousness in animals and machines, inside-out
An interesting paper came up in my feeds this weekend: Indicators and Criteria of Consciousness in Animals and Intelligent Machines: An Inside-Out Approach. The authors put forth a definition of consciousness, and then criteria to test for it, although they emphasize that these can't be "hard" criteria, just indicators. None of them individually definitely establish … Continue reading Detecting consciousness in animals and machines, inside-out
Higher order theories of consciousness
I've posted on HOT (higher order thought theories of consciousness) before, but there's a new paper out covering the basics of these types of theories. Since first reading about HOT many months ago, the framework has been growing on me. The paper is not too technical and I think would be accessible to most interested … Continue reading Higher order theories of consciousness
Time to dump the concept of cognition?
An interesting paper came up in my Twitter feed. Neuroscientist Paul Cisek notes that many of our current models on how the mind works come from dualistic traditions, as well as psychological ones that were heavily influenced by dualism. He sees the concept of cognition having largely been created after dualism was abandoned. It made … Continue reading Time to dump the concept of cognition?