The right reason to doubt the simulation hypothesis

This weekend, Sabine Hossenfelder did a video and post about the simulation hypothesis, the idea that we might be living in a computer simulation. She dismisses the notion that consciousness can't be a computational simulation, which I think is correct, but then settles on the idea that physics itself can't be simulated, because we have … Continue reading The right reason to doubt the simulation hypothesis

Platonism and the non-physical

On occasion, I've been accused of being closed-minded.  (Shocking, I know.)  Frequently the reason is not seriously considering non-physical propositions, a perception of rigid physicalism.  However, as I've noted before, I'm actually not entirely comfortable with the "physicalist" label (or "materialist", or other synonyms or near synonyms).  While it's fairly accurate as to my working … Continue reading Platonism and the non-physical

Logic has empirical foundations, sort of.

Massimo Pigliucci has an interesting post at Scientia Salon on philosophical zombies.  Massimo looks at David Chalmers's argument for philosophical zombie arguments and, I think, does an excellent job at showing the problems with them.  But in the discussion, a distinction is made that I find interesting. Apparently, Chalmers admits that zombies are probably not naturally … Continue reading Logic has empirical foundations, sort of.

The Marionette’s Lament : A Response to Daniel Dennett : : Sam Harris

Dear Dan— I’d like to begin by thanking you for taking the time to review Free Will at such length. Publicly engaging me on this topic is certainly preferable to grumbling in private. Your writing is admirably clear, as always, which worries me in this case, because we appear to disagree about a great many … Continue reading The Marionette’s Lament : A Response to Daniel Dennett : : Sam Harris