Ponderings of science, philosophy, history, society, and many other topics
David Chalmers in his new book: : Reality+: Virtual Worlds and the Problems of Philosophy, takes the philosophical stance of virtual realism. As I understand it, virtual realism is the thesis that virtual reality is genuine reality, with emphasis especially on the view that virtual objects are real and not an illusion. In general, “realism” is … Continue reading Criteria for being real
I'm currently making my way through David Chalmers' new book: Reality+: Virtual Worlds and the Problems of Philosophy. Chalmers explores the simulation hypothesis, using it as a portal into a wide ranging selection of philosophical issues, including discussions on God, information theory, structuralism, and a lot of other topics I haven't gotten to yet. His … Continue reading Can we know if we’re in a simulation?
The central mystery of quantum mechanics is that quantum particles move like waves but hit and leave effects like localized particles. This is true of elementary particles, atoms, molecules, and increasingly larger objects, possibly macroscopic ones. It's even true of collections of entangled particles, no matter how separated the particles may have become. People have … Continue reading The benefits of wave function realism?
The other day I did a post on structural realism. If you found that interesting, you might find this interview of James Ladyman by Sean Carroll worth listening to (or reading, since there's a transcript). Ladyman is the author of the SEP article on structural realism I linked to, and seems to be a major … Continue reading Interviews of James Ladyman on metaphysics
This weekend, Sabine Hossenfelder did a video and post about the simulation hypothesis, the idea that we might be living in a computer simulation. She dismisses the notion that consciousness can't be a computational simulation, which I think is correct, but then settles on the idea that physics itself can't be simulated, because we have … Continue reading The right reason to doubt the simulation hypothesis
Philosopher Wilfrid Sellars had a term for the world as it appears, the "manifest image." This is the world as we perceive it. In it, an apple is an apple, something red or green with a certain shape, a range of sizes, a thing that we can eat, or throw. The manifest image can be … Continue reading Is the ultimate nature of reality mental?
On occasion, I've been accused of being closed-minded. (Shocking, I know.) Frequently the reason is not seriously considering non-physical propositions, a perception of rigid physicalism. However, as I've noted before, I'm actually not entirely comfortable with the "physicalist" label (or "materialist", or other synonyms or near synonyms). While it's fairly accurate as to my working … Continue reading Platonism and the non-physical
I have to say that this is along the lines of what I think about when people confidently assert the existence of the multiverse, their favorite interpretation of quantum physics, or any other metaphysical assertion. via xkcd: Squirrel Plan.
Click through for the full version. see the rest at: A Dialogue on Compatibilism - Existential Comics. This edition of Existential Comics manages to summarize most of the free will debate. I especially like the discussion on libertarian free will on the second page. As a compatibilist myself, I've often said that libertarian free will is … Continue reading A dialogue on compatibilism
Massimo Pigliucci has an interesting post at Scientia Salon on philosophical zombies. Massimo looks at David Chalmers's argument for philosophical zombie arguments and, I think, does an excellent job at showing the problems with them. But in the discussion, a distinction is made that I find interesting. Apparently, Chalmers admits that zombies are probably not naturally … Continue reading Logic has empirical foundations, sort of.
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