This weekend, Sabine Hossenfelder did a video and post about the simulation hypothesis, the idea that we might be living in a computer simulation. She dismisses the notion that consciousness can't be a computational simulation, which I think is correct, but then settles on the idea that physics itself can't be simulated, because we have … Continue reading The right reason to doubt the simulation hypothesis
Philosopher Wilfrid Sellars had a term for the world as it appears, the "manifest image." This is the world as we perceive it. In it, an apple is an apple, something red or green with a certain shape, a range of sizes, a thing that we can eat, or throw. The manifest image can be … Continue reading Is the ultimate nature of reality mental?
On occasion, I've been accused of being closed-minded. (Shocking, I know.) Frequently the reason is not seriously considering non-physical propositions, a perception of rigid physicalism. However, as I've noted before, I'm actually not entirely comfortable with the "physicalist" label (or "materialist", or other synonyms or near synonyms). While it's fairly accurate as to my working … Continue reading Platonism and the non-physical
I have to say that this is along the lines of what I think about when people confidently assert the existence of the multiverse, their favorite interpretation of quantum physics, or any other metaphysical assertion. via xkcd: Squirrel Plan.
Click through for the full version. see the rest at: A Dialogue on Compatibilism - Existential Comics. This edition of Existential Comics manages to summarize most of the free will debate. I especially like the discussion on libertarian free will on the second page. As a compatibilist myself, I've often said that libertarian free will is … Continue reading A dialogue on compatibilism
Massimo Pigliucci has an interesting post at Scientia Salon on philosophical zombies. Massimo looks at David Chalmers's argument for philosophical zombie arguments and, I think, does an excellent job at showing the problems with them. But in the discussion, a distinction is made that I find interesting. Apparently, Chalmers admits that zombies are probably not naturally … Continue reading Logic has empirical foundations, sort of.
Dear Dan— I’d like to begin by thanking you for taking the time to review Free Will at such length. Publicly engaging me on this topic is certainly preferable to grumbling in private. Your writing is admirably clear, as always, which worries me in this case, because we appear to disagree about a great many … Continue reading The Marionette’s Lament : A Response to Daniel Dennett : : Sam Harris