Peter Hankins at Conscious Entities has a post looking at the morality of consciousness, which is a commentary on piece at Nautilus by Jim Davies on the same topic. I recommend reading both posts in their entirety, but the overall gist is that which animals or systems are conscious has moral implications, since only conscious … Continue reading The system components of pain
Tag: Philosophy of Mind
Why embodiment does not make mind copying impossible
A while back, I highlighted a TEDX talk by Anil Seth where he discussed that cognition is largely a prediction machine. Apparently Seth more recently gave another talk at the full TED conference, which is receiving rave reviews. Unfortunately, that talk doesn't appear to be online yet. But one article reviewing the talk focuses on something … Continue reading Why embodiment does not make mind copying impossible
Steven Pinker: From neurons to consciousness
This lecture from Steven Pinker has been around for a while, but it seems to get at a question a few people have asked me recently: how does the information processing of neurons and synapses lead to conscious perception? Pinker doesn't answer this question comprehensively (that would require a vast series of lectures), but he answers facets of … Continue reading Steven Pinker: From neurons to consciousness
Is consciousness only in the back of the brain?
There's an interesting debate going on among some neuroscientists about which parts of the brain are involved in subjective experience. On the one side are Christof Koch, Giuilio Tononi, and colleagues who argue that consciousness exists wholly in the back of the brain, that the frontal structures are not involved. On the other side are neuroscientists … Continue reading Is consciousness only in the back of the brain?
What about subjective experience implies anything non-physical?
Mary's room is a classic philosophical thought experiment about consciousness. The Wikipedia article on what's called the knowledge argument quotes Frank Jackson, the originator of the argument, as follows: Mary is a brilliant scientist who is, for whatever reason, forced to investigate the world from a black and white room via a black and white … Continue reading What about subjective experience implies anything non-physical?
Being a beast machine
In my post on consciousness possibly being a simulation engine, I noted Anil Seth's excellent Aeon article as one of the inspirations. As it turns out, Seth talked at a TEDx conference and covered many of the same topics he addressed in that article. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1syDjtlMGbo As noted in my post, I think a lot of … Continue reading Being a beast machine
Two brain science podcasts worth checking out
As my long time readers will know, I'm very interested in the mind, and my preferred way to explore it is through science, notably neuroscience or cognitive psychology, or with science oriented philosophy. With that in mind, I want to call your attention to a couple of podcasts I've been following for a while. The … Continue reading Two brain science podcasts worth checking out
A possible answer to the hard problem of consciousness: subjective experience is communication
In 1995, David Chalmers coined the "hard problem of consciousness": It is undeniable that some organisms are subjects of experience. But the question of how it is that these systems are subjects of experience is perplexing. Why is it that when our cognitive systems engage in visual and auditory information-processing, we have visual or auditory … Continue reading A possible answer to the hard problem of consciousness: subjective experience is communication
The illusion of phenomenal consciousness?
Philosopher Peter Hankins at Conscious Entities has a write-up on the November 12 issue of the JCS (Journal of Consciousness Studies) in which philosophers, psychologists, and neuroscientists such as Keith Frankish, Daniel Dennett, Susan Blackmore, and Michael Graziano, debate whether it makes sense to refer to phenomenal consciousness as an illusion. Unfortunately the full text of the … Continue reading The illusion of phenomenal consciousness?
Daniel Wolpert: The real reason for brains
I came across this old TED talk today and decided to share it because it's relevant to the previous post on consciousness and simulations. Daniel Wolpert's talk doesn't address consciousness specifically, only the overall role of the simulations, but it's still a fascinating exploration of what we're doing when our attention is focused on a … Continue reading Daniel Wolpert: The real reason for brains

