Consciousness lies in the eye of the beholder

There are few things that everyone who ponders consciousness can agree on.  It's a topic where debates on the very definition of the subject are common.  The only definitions that seem to command near universal assent are the ones oriented toward phenomenology, such as "subjective experience" or "something it is like."  And even then, the … Continue reading Consciousness lies in the eye of the beholder

The implications of embodied cognition

Sean Carroll on his podcast interviewed Lisa Aziz-Zadeh on embodied cognition: Brains are important things; they’re where thinking happens. Or are they? The theory of “embodied cognition” posits that it’s better to think of thinking as something that takes place in the body as a whole, not just in the cells of the brain. In … Continue reading The implications of embodied cognition

A qualified recommendation: Consciousness Demystified

Consciousness Demystified cover

A couple of years ago I did a series of posts inspired by Todd Feinberg and Jon Mallatt's excellent  The Ancient Origins of Consciousness, a book on the evolution of animal consciousness.  Somewhat building on what I had read in Antonio Damasio's Self Comes to Mind, it was a pivotal point in my exploration of … Continue reading A qualified recommendation: Consciousness Demystified

The construction of feelings

I've had a number of conversations lately on the subject of feelings, the affective states of having valences about conscious perception, such as fear, pain, joy, hunger, etc.  Apparently a lot of people view feelings as a very mysterious phenomenon.  While I'll definitely agree that there are a lot of details still to be worked … Continue reading The construction of feelings

Inflate and explode, or deflate and preserve?

Philosopher Eric Schwitzgebel has an interesting post up criticizing the arguments of illusionists, those who have concluded that phenomenal consciousness is an illusion. Here's a way to deny the existence of things of Type X. Assume that things of Type X must have Property A, and then argue that nothing has Property A. If that … Continue reading Inflate and explode, or deflate and preserve?

The prospects for a scientific understanding of consciousness

Michael Shermer has an article up at Scientific American asking if science will ever understand consciousness, free will, or God. I contend that not only consciousness but also free will and God are mysterian problems—not because we are not yet smart enough to solve them but because they can never be solved, not even in … Continue reading The prospects for a scientific understanding of consciousness

Does information require conscious interpretation to be information?

Peter Kassan has an article at Skeptic Magazine which sets out to disprove the simulation hypothesis, the idea that we're all living in a computer simulation. I personally find arguing about the simulation hypothesis unproductive.  Short of the simulation owner deciding to jump in and contact us, we can't prove the hypothesis.  Even if the … Continue reading Does information require conscious interpretation to be information?

Layers of self awareness and animal cognition

In the last consciousness post, which discussed issues with panpsychism and simple definitions of consciousness, I laid out five functional layers of cognition which I find helpful when trying to think about systems that are more or less conscious.  Just to recap, those layers are: Reflexes, primal reactions to stimuli. Perception, sensory models of the … Continue reading Layers of self awareness and animal cognition

Panpsychism and layers of consciousness

I've written before about panpyschism, the outlook that everything is conscious and that consciousness permeates the universe.  However, that previous post was within the context of replying to a TEDx talk, and I'm not entirely satisfied with the remarks I made back then, so this is a revisit of that topic. I've noted many times … Continue reading Panpsychism and layers of consciousness